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Article
Refining Advertising Regulation
DAVID ADAM FRIEDMAN
Why did the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) aggressively pursue
Volkswagen's claims about "clean-diesel" technology, while ignoring
widespread practices like deceptive discount pricing? Why did the FTC offer
formal guidance to industry about "native advertising, " but only casual
guidance to consumers about widely-used, peer-review aggregators like
Yelp and Fandango?
For decades, the FTC has only loosely employed a cost-benefit-analysis
approach toward prioritizing enforcement of advertising regulation. I
contend that federal regulators can best refine enforcement priorities by
looking to the information economics literature for an established
framework for classifying advertising claims. This Article shows that
classifying advertising into search claims, experience claims, and credence
claims offers a structure for more rigorous cost-benefit analysis of
enforcement opportunities. Expressly incorporating this search-experience-
credence claim framework into regulatory decision making and
prioritization will lead to improved stewardship of FTC resources.
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Refining Advertising Regulation
DAVID ADAM FRIEDMAN*
INTRODUCTION
Volkswagen's promotion of "clean diesel" automotive technology
presented a false advertising claim of potentially historic proportions.' The
German automaker's false advertisement about a tangible, professionally-
testable product feature like emission levels offers an obvious opportunity
for regulatory enforcement. Several authorities, including the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), promptly opened investigations into the automaker's
trade practices, and Volkswagen settled quickly at great expense. 2
In contrast, for the past fifty years, the FTC has declined to pursue false
price-discounting claims,3 even though these claims share a commonality
with the Volkswagen clean-diesel claim. Consumer verification of both
claims proves costly and impractical. Deceptive advertising of retail
prices-broadly labeled "fictitious pricing" 4-decreases welfare in the same
manner as "fictitious" clean-diesel advertising. Consumers buy the "wrong"
goods at the "wrong" prices.5 The FTC recently devoted regulatory attention
to "native advertising"6 but only gave lip service to potential problems
relating to peer-information brokers like Yelp and Fandango.7 Why does the
FTC scrutinize some practices more than others? Can regulators improve the
* Associate Professor of Law, Willamette University. B.A., J.D., Yale University.
'See Jad Mouawad & Sydney Ember, VW's Pitch to Americans Relied on Fun and Fantasy, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2015, at BI (discussing the millions of cars sold by Volkswagen based on false reports
of their emissions test performance). The nitrogen-oxide emissions from these supposedly "clean"
vehicles exceeded the regulatory limit by a factor of forty. Russell Hotten, Volkswagen: The Scandal
Explained, BBC NEWS (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772
[https://perma.cc/7EAS-96YD].
2 See infra Section I.A.3 for a discussion of the Volkswagen controversy.
See David Adam Friedman, Reconsidering Fictitious Pricing, 100 MINN. L. REV. 921, 93 7-52
(2016) [hereinafter Friedman, Fictitious Pricing] (describing history of FTC approach to fictitious
pricing); Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90
HARV. L. REV. 661, 663-67 (1977) (explaining the rationale for abandoning enforcement of fictitious
pricing in the 1970s).
4 The FTC affixed this label to these practices in their guidelines. See Guides Against Deceptive
Pricing, 16 C.F.R. § 233 (2016).
See FTC v. QT, Inc., 512 F.3d 858, 863 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that accurate pricing requires
truth in the market about product qualities).
6 "Native advertising" describes commercial messaging that matches the non-commercial context
within which it appears; an advertisement that appears to look like a news article in a magazine, for
example. See infra Section IlI.C.
'See infra Section II.B.
prioritization of enforcement of advertising regulation?
In this Article, I demonstrate that the FTC can refine the approach
toward advertising regulation by applying an established tool from the
information-economics literature, the search-experience-credence (SEC)
framework. Application of the SEC framework promotes different
enforcement priorities. For example, the SEC framework strongly suggests
that regulators should take fictitious pricing as seriously as "clean-diesel"
claims. The SEC framework also reveals that the practices of the newly-
emerged peer-information-brokerage industry require a more nuanced
scrutiny than traditional advertiser-promoted consumer-testimonial
endorsements. Similarly, the SEC framework offers a needed roadmap for
enforcing the native advertising guidelines released in 2015.'
The SEC framework provides a helpful and orderly structure for
categorizing all advertising claims.' SEC claims refer to the categories of
"search" claims, "experience" claims, and "credence" claims."o Search
claims should require lower regulatory scrutiny because they describe basic
offering attributes like price, product category, and location of sale." Search
claims enable sellers to inform buyers about how to find an offering by
communicating this basic information-information easily verified by
consumers.
Experience claims, in contrast, must be verified after purchase.' 2
Experience claims warrant more regulatory scrutiny than search claims
because the consumer still bears the cost of testing the integrity of an
experience claim. Consumers can more readily correct experience claims for
low-price offerings by declining to repurchase, but they still absorb the loss
from the initial purchase.
Credence claims describe advertiser communications that prove
prohibitively costly or conceptually impossible for the consumer to verify,
even post-purchase." Examples of credence claims include, "Volkswagen
I See FED. TRADE COMM'N, NATIVE ADVERTISING: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESSES (2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/native-advertising-guide-businesses
[https://perma.cc/PR5F-QBHM]. The FTC defines "native advertising" as "content that bears a similarity
to the news, feature articles, product reviews, entertainment, and other material that surrounds it online."
Id.
' See Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. EcON. 729, 730 (1974) [hereinafter
Nelson, Advertising] (describing search qualities and experience qualities as distinct categories of
advertising claims); Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. EcON. 311, 312-14,
327 (1970) [hereinafter Nelson, Information] (distinguishing the search category of advertising claims,
where consumers gather product information through simple inspection, from the experience category,
where consumers purchase products as costs permit and use the products to determine their quality).
Phillip Nelson's framework provided the foundation for the SEC framework in the 1970s. See infra
Section I.
'0 See infra Section l.A.
See infra Section I.A.2.
2 See id
' See infra Section I.A.3.
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has ushered in a new era of clean diesel with this automobile" 4 and "These
sweaters are 50% off."
Integrating the broader SEC framework into enforcement policy would
help the FTC improve the efficacy of consumer-protection enforcement. The
FTC's Office of Inspector General has already encouraged the Commission
to develop a "more structured methodology" and a "more formal process . .
. for optimiz[ing] the pursuit of its consumer protection mission."15 The SEC
framework offers structure for just such an optimization methodology, as I
will demonstrate throughout this Article.
Adding the SEC framework to the enforcement calculation would refine
and improve FTC resource allocation without presenting ajarring departure
from current practices. According to my content analysis of FTC actions, the
FTC already prioritizes credence claims, so formalizing this extra layer of
rigor offers a significant but pragmatic policy change.
In Section I, I describe the SEC framework for categorizing advertising
claims and assess the cost-benefit implications for addressing each category
of SEC claim. Each category of claim invites a different approach to
regulatory intervention. In Section 11, I show the empirical results of my
content analysis of FTC advertising enforcement actions showing that the
most commonly-enforced claims already fall into the credence and
"experience-credence" categories. However, a systematic application of the
SEC approach would optimize enforcement both in novel and established
enforcement areas. Section III analyzes three case studies to illustrate how
this approach would change enforcement priorities. I analyze discount
pricing, aggregated peer-to-peer reviews, and native advertising to show
how the SEC framework provides more structure to the process of sorting
enforcement priorities. A recounting of FTC policy development in Section
IV provides context to show that incorporating the SEC framework would
elegantly follow the FTC's established approach toward prioritizing
advertising enforcement. Finally, I conclude that the SEC framework would
add rigor to the FTC process.
I. CATEGORIZING SEARCH, EXPERIENCE, AND CREDENCE CLAIMS
Shortly in the wake of George Stigler's landmark work on information
economics,16 Phillip Nelson sparked a new line of scholarship focusing on
4 See id.
" FED. TRADE COMM'N OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., EVALUATION OF THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION'S BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION RESOURCES, OlG EVALUATION REPORT No. 14-
003 13 (Oct. 2, 2014), [hereinafter OIG Evaluation Report] https://www.fic.gov/system/files/document
s/reports/evaluation-ftc-bureau-consumer-protection-resources/2015evaluationftcbcpreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X6AM-TJNB].
16 George Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961). Stigler reclaimed
the role of information out of the "slum dwelling" of economics and into the mainstream of the field. Id.
at 213. He explained the role advertising and information play in the variation of commodity prices.
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the nature of consumer information gathering. Nelson identified and
described two primary attributes of products that consumers use for
transactional decision making-search and experience. 17 A few years later,
Michael Darby and Edi Karni introduced the concept of credence attributes,
supplementing Nelson's framework."
Advertisers make claims that contain SEC attributes.1 9 They inject these
claims into the market to yield transactional decisions favorable to
themselves.20 Some claims give basic data to consumers, such as where a
product can be found or the simple price point. Others convey what
consumers should expect to experience from use of the offering. Nelson's
delineation of the difference between search and experience serves as a
platform for refining priorities for federal regulation of advertising claims.2 1
The concept of sorting advertising claims into search, experience, and
credence categories evolved since Nelson's initial efforts.22 Below, I discuss
the evolution of these SEC categories, using examples to show how
consumers and regulators interact with each type of claim, ultimately
building toward the prescription that the FTC should formally put the SEC
Traditional economic models expected the price for a commodity to be uniform within the market, with
allowances for transportation costs. Stigler demonstrated that information and search costs for goods can
also drive price differentiation for a given commodity. Id. at 219. For a closely related piece, also part of
the canon, see George Stigler, Information in the Labor Market, 70 J. POL. ECON. 94, 94, 96-97 (1962)
(explaining wage dispersion as an information problem, resulting from both imperfect employee
knowledge of fluctuating "wage offers" and low returns to incremental search).
" Nelson deemed certain "goods" as "search" goods or "experience" goods based on their dominant
attributes. See Nelson, Information, supra note 9, at 312. Nelson further contended that "limitations of
consumer information about quality have profound effects upon the market structure of consumer goods."
Id. at 311; see Nelson, Advertising, supra note 9, at 732 ("Experience-claim advertising signals to
consumers low-content information, but also signals that the seller advertises and that 'the more a brand
advertises, the more likely it is to be a better buy."'); see also Phillip Nelson, The Economic
Consequences of Advertising, 48 J. Bus. 213 (1975) [hereinafter Nelson, Economic Consequences].
Nelson implicitly permits addition of "credence" claims and associated resource challenges in addressing
the credence category: "[S]uppose that there are goods whose utility consumers cannot learn of through
experience .... In this case, producers are prevented from [false labeling] by laws prohibiting fraud. But
since scarce resources are used to enforce these laws, it never pays the government to wipe out fraud
entirely." Nelson, Economic Consequences, supra, at 215.
I' Contemporaneously with Nelson's work, Michael R. Darby and Edi Karni distinguished the
concept of credence qualities and credence "goods." See Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free
Competition and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67, 68-72 (1973).
1 Claims often span categories, as my primary research shows. See infra Section II.
2o See Nelson, Advertising, supra note 9, at 729 ("The producer in his advertising is not interested
directly in providing information for consumers. He is interested in selling more of his product.").
21 Gary T. Ford et al., An Empirical Test of the Search, Experience and Credence Attributes
Framework, 15 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER REs. 239 (1988), http://www.acrwebsite.org/search/view-
conference-proceedings.aspx?ld=6817 [https://perma.cc/E2E6-FTX6] ("[I]n the past, researchers have
often referred to 'goods' or 'attributes' of goods as having either search, experience or credence qualities.
More appropriately, the focus must be on the advertising claim, rather than the attribute of the product.").
I embrace the approach of Ford et al., focusing on SEC in the context of describing advertising claims
rather than SEC as describing categories of goods.
22 See Lee Goldman, The World's Best Article on Competitor Suits for False Advertising, 45 FLA.
L. REv. 487, 498-501 (1993) (summarizing the structure of search, experience, and credence claims).
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framework to use. I describe the evolution of the SEC framework in Section
I.A. In Section I.B, I use hypotheticals to show how consumers, advertisers,
and regulators engage with each type of SEC advertising claim.
A. Fleshing out the SEC Framework
Nelson focused on the market dynamics that follow when consumer
acquisition costs for different types of information diverge.23 He noted that
the "most obvious procedure available to the consumer in obtaining
information about price or quality is search."2 4 Given the obviousness,
primacy, and accessibility of search claims in the market, the consumer costs
to access search information are generally the lowest of the SEC trio. Nelson
described search in terms of "inspection"-advertised search claims would
present information that consumers could obtain and verify through actual
inspection prior to a purchase decision. 25 Searches for "quality" require the
consumer to experience usage after purchase, so I address "experience"-
based claims as a separate category.26 Price, product availability, and general
category of offering (e.g., a television, a floor wax, a dessert topping) typify
primary search claim characteristics.
Price claims generate more complications than other types of search
claims, 27 so I focus there, before discussing experience and credence claims.
I contend that the dynamics of price advertising provide a compelling
example of how the FTC should use the SEC framework to refine the
approach toward enforcement of advertising regulation.
1. Search
Nelson's early construct promoted the basic premise that consumers
search for information about both price and quality. 28 Price, as a general
matter, proves comparatively inexpensive for consumers to find,2 9 and
simple for advertisers to transmit. When retailers advertise price
straightforwardly or in good faith, 3 a cursory consumer inspection of price
23 Nelson, Information, supra note 9, at 311-12.
24 Id. at 312.
25 Id.
26 See id. (discussing consumer evaluation of product quality through experience as distinct from
other methods of search).
27 Although advertisers can still exploit the consumer's search for "availability" through bait-and-
switch tactics. See David Adam Friedman, Explaining "Bait-and-Switch" Regulation, 4 WM. & MARY
BUS. L. REv. 575, 586-88 (2013) [hereinafter Friedman, Bait-and-Switch].
2 See Nelson, Information, supra note 9, at 311-12 (discussing the effects of the costs of quality
information and price information on consumer search behavior).
29 "A consumer can search for quality as well as price. A consumer trying on a dress differs from a
consumer determining the price of a dress only because the time required to try on a dress is longer." Id
at 312.
3 "Fictitious pricing" requires a deviation from a "good faith" standard. "The advertiser should be
especially careful, however, [when promoting a discount from a prior price], that the [prior] price is one
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yields an accurate conception of price.
However, where retailers muddy price signals through bundled
offerings" or through discount advertising,32 the inspection and verification
costs about the context of the price claim may be high enough to warrant
placing these claims in the credence category-a departure from the
established view. Such a re-categorization would reinforce the premise that
higher regulatory scrutiny should be directed toward such practices. The
SEC framework would reveal this point to regulators with more clarity.
As I have explored elsewhere, pricing items as "free" proves deceptive
if the seller conditions provision of the free item on the purchase of a non-
free item without adequate disclosure.3 3 The potential for confusion resides
in the consumer's initial attraction to the "free" good. For example, the offer
of a "free" smartphone, provided only upon entering into a two-year service
contract with a wireless carrier, could lawfully obscure the true cost of the
elements of the bundle. If the disclosure is unclear or inconspicuous, the
"free" advertising tactic proves unlawful. FTC guidelines require clear and
conspicuous disclosures of any conditional commitment attached to a free
item.34 Through this regulation, the FTC implicitly recognizes that
verification of this type of search claim requires extra investigation by
consumers.
Price claims, if facially simple, provide little room for deception,
especially if the seller makes no further claim about the nature of the price.
The relative purity of this type of search claim does not demand high
regulatory scrutiny. However, when advertisers manipulate the shopping
process through claims about free offers, discounts, comparative pricing, or
having "the lowest price," the claim warrants more regulatory scrutiny.
These claims are not price claims per se; they are claims about the nature of
the price. Though price may offer a primary example of a search claim, a
claim about the price proves costlier for consumers to verify.
2. Experience
Generally, acquiring information about "quality" of offerings proves
at which the product was openly and actively offered for sale, for a reasonably substantial period of time,
in the recent, regular course of his business, honestly and in good faith." Guides Against Deceptive
Pricing, 16 C.F.R. § 233.1(b) (2016).
31 See David Adam Friedman, Free Offers: A New Look, 38 N.M. L. REV. 49, 73-75 (2008)
[hereinafter Friedman, Free Offers] (discussing consumer perception and misperception of the value of
bundles of free goods and services).
32 See Dhruv Grewal & Larry D. Compeau, Comparative Price Advertising: Informative or
Deceptive?, II J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 52, 54-56 (1992) (documenting meta-analysis of welfare
losses resulting from discount-price advertising offered in bad faith).
" See Friedman, Free Offers, supra note 31, at 49, 54-56 (discussing the FTC Guidelines for
disclosure of conditions on free offers).
14 FTC Guide Concerning Use of the Word "Free" and Similar Representations, 16. C.F.R. §
251.1(c) (2016).
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costlier for consumers than price, requiring consumer "experience" for
verification.3 5 Experiencing an offering takes time and effort. Further,
consumers risk full absorption of the cost of a disappointing experience, 3 6
both the endurance of the negative experience and the economic loss.
Consumers expect the experiential outcome from a transaction to carry
some degree of uncertainty.37 The purchase of a cinderblock might yield a
narrower band of experience expectation than the purchase of a meal at a
new restaurant. Advertisers, aware that this uncertainty could prove to
"make or break" a transaction, often make advance claims about
experience-claims that can be verified by consumers only after the fact or
by advance sampling.
Compared to search claims, consumers may accord more varied weight
to an array of advertised experience claims. Buying a movie ticket, for
example, creates certain narrower, more definitive experiential
expectations-the time the movie will start, the availability of a seat, and
that the movie will feature the actors on the billing. However, consumers
would likely have more skepticism toward less definitive experiential claims
made by the stars of the show that the film will entertain. Consumers likely
know that movies vary from their advertised expectation.
A cinderblock, on the other hand, which retails for roughly one dollar,
offers fewer advertised experience claims because usage will not yield much
incremental actionable information. In contrast, a restaurant's website may
show pictures of the interior atmosphere and depictions of dishes. A
potential diner may also encounter other sources of experiential information,
notably peer reviews and neutral critiques. Rather than engaging in the
expensive process of self-inspection, or post-purchase experiential claim
evaluation, the consumer can "borrow" experience from peers to evaluate
claims prior to purchase. This information lowers inspection costs.
To illustrate consumer experience and quality assessment, Nelson
presented the example of shopping for a high-priced, "big-ticket" article of
clothing-a dress.38 Inspection of a dress may require trying on the dress to
determine whether the item's value matches the price.39 Searching for
quality requires more time for items that run in variation and require
individual reconciliations of taste; where items resemble commodities,
quality requires less experience for verification.4 0 This time investment
presents a necessary path for obtaining the information to enable a
purchasing decision.4 1 The additional cost of inspection carries a return on
3 Nelson, Information, supra note 9, at 312.
36
37Id.
38 Id.
" Id.
40 d. at 314.
41 See id. at 312 (providing examples of goods that the customer would prefer to evaluate by
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the investment, mitigating risk of the purchase by reducing information
asymmetry, and smoothing out any so-called "lemons" problems.42
The inspection opportunity might not always yield an adequate
prospective return on investment and, thus, may not always be availed. Time
scarcity may discourage the rational consumer from obtaining useful
"quality" information about a purchase. Nelson provides the example of
choosing a brand of a can of tuna fish.43 The can has a low-ticket price,
rendering a thorough quality-sampling search of all available brands
inefficient." Nelson noted that the low value of a unit of canned tuna fish
presumably preempts the emergence of free-market tuna fish sampling
enterprises or tuna fish consumer publications. 4 5
Nelson surmised that consumers would engage "experience" through
the shopping process.46 For example, they would purchase a brand of tuna
fish, evaluate and "experience" the offering, and subsequently purchase
other brands until arriving at the one that either best meets their tastes or
matches the experience claim that drew initial interest 47-at least until the
costs of further sampling outweighed the perceived benefits.
In contrast, shopping for higher-priced, personal items-like dresses or
automobiles-may warrant repeated testing or sampling prior to purchase.
Clothing retailers add social value, in part, by enabling consumers to inspect
a varied stock of dresses for sale and by providing a space to see which ones
feel and look the best. If a retailer makes "experience" a cost-effective way
for the consumer to gather information, the retailer becomes a more efficient
venue for a transaction. "Brick-and-mortar" clothing retailers exist in part
because they play a valued role in enabling consumers to shop with the
benefit of experience.
Returning to the tuna fish example, advertisers make express, verifiable
claims about canned tuna. One tuna-fish manufacturer claims that canned
purchase rather than by search).
42 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quahiy Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 490 (1970) (positing that asymmetry of information among buyers and
sellers can lead to market failure).
43 Nelson, Information, supra note 9, at 312.
4 Id.
" See id. ("At the low price of experience, there is insufficient demand for specialized
establishments selling tastes of various brands of tuna fish."). In contrast, consider a big-ticket item, the
automobile. The proliferation of automotive comparison publications and websites presents, perhaps, a
reflection of both the expense and value of experiential sampling. These publications enable consumers
to narrow down the number of automobiles for test-drive-a time-intensive inspection process. See, e.g.,
CAR & DRIVER, http://www.caranddriver.com [https://perma.cc/6SGH-JAQY] (last visited Sept. 21,
2016); EDMUNDS, http://www.edmunds.com [https://perma.cc/C7C4-MFSQ] (last visited Sept. 21,
2016); MOTOR TREND, http://www.motortrend.com [https://permacc/9YYA-FBSP] (last visited Sept.
21, 2016).
' See Nelson, Information, supra note 9, at 314.
47 See id. at 312.
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tuna of their brand has a "flavor of the sea."" The only means of testing this
claim would be to taste the tuna itself. If the consumer believed that the claim
did not match the taste, the consumer could elect the next time to purchase
a different brand, a different product category entirely, or nothing at all. But
the consumer would absorb several costs-the potentially unpleasant taste
of the failed experience, the time invested in sampling, and the cost of the
consumed item. Even pursuing a refund or return for such a low-ticket item
may prove more expensive than any benefit.
Compared with straightforwardly advertised search claims, the need for
regulatory intervention for bad-faith experience claims ranks higher, as a
general proposition. The risk is greater where a consumer may be deceived
into absorbing a loss. For this reason, big-ticket items may need enhanced
scrutiny. Regulators should enhance their monitoring as to "borrowed" peer
experience claims, for example, in the form of paying third parties to post
fraudulent peer reviews."9 In an instant case, consumers run a greater risk of
trusting fraudulent peer reviews and making suboptimal transaction
decisions. As a broader concern, if peer experience claims elude appropriate
policing, consumers may begin to discount them, rendering a potentially rich
source of quality information less useful and trustworthy. If the cost of
inspection rises, the transactional process becomes less efficient.
Even if experience claims prove false, consumers can more typically
correct them after the experience, although sometimes at a cost. With
credence claims, however, consumers lack that easier ability to self-correct,
rendering credence claims the highest regulatory concern of the three.
3. Separating Credence from Experience
In 1973, Michael Darby and Edy Karni "distinguish[ed] a third class of
properties which [they] term[ed] 'credence' qualities. Credence qualities are
those which . . . cannot be evaluated in normal use. Instead the assessment
of their value requires additional costly information." 0 Consumer inspection
and post-experience evaluation cannot easily nor readily verify or discredit
credence claims.
Darby and Karni offered a few examples of credence claims, the most
salient relating to repair services for consumer goods. "A consumer cannot
fully evaluate the repair of a malfunctioning durable good ... since he is
unfamiliar with the intricacies and peculiarities of the particular machine.""
48 E.g., Wild Planet Wild Skipjack Light Tuna, 5-oz. Cans (Count of 12), AMAZON,
http://www.amazon.com/Wild-Planet-Skipjack-Light-5-oz/dp/BOOI SB8AZC?th=1
[https://perma.cc/4GRF-FTXZ] (last visited Sept. 21, 2016).
4' The FTC recently revised guidance that restricts the nature of peer endorsements, but it has yet
to enforce the revisions to this guidance. See FTC Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and
Testimonials in Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 255.0 (2016).
so Darby & Kami, supra note 18, at 68-69.
5 Id. at 69.
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Take the case of a mechanic selling an automobile maintenance procedure
to a consumer.52 The mechanic may claim that a flush of coolant fluid will
prevent highway breakdowns, but the information that the instant
circumstance requires a coolant flush is difficult (not impossible, but
difficult) to gather through search or experience. Even if neutral
recommendations advise that a flush is unnecessary, the car owner may not
be able to assess the benefits of a flush (or the risks of not purchasing the
flush) for that particular car. If the consumer purchases the flush, and the
automobile does not break down, even after the fact, the owner cannot
discern whether the coolant flush prevented a breakdown or mitigated such
risk.
Credence claims, as my own content analysis reveals, receive more
enforcement attention from federal regulators. A recent example of a classic
false-credence claim prosecution involved mass-market "quackery" that
hearkened back to nineteenth-century medicine shows." In FTC v. QT,
Inc.,5 the Seventh Circuit affirmed an FTC order against the manufacturer
of a cure-all product, Q-Ray Ionized Bracelets." The manufacturer claimed
that this "test-proven"" metal jewelry would alleviate pain by emitting
ionized "Q-Rays,"57 but the Commission determined that the only available
scientific support showed that the bracelets merely yielded a placebo
effect." Judge Frank Easterbrook found claims of Q-Ray's "test-proven"
product efficacy misleading because supporting scientific evidence proved
insufficient.59 In QT, "almost everything that defendants [had] said about the
[Q-Ray] bracelet [was] false."o
Judge Easterbrook expounded upon the social harm that results from
such false credence-claim advertising.61 He conceded that many enjoy a
placebo effect from products such as the Q-Ray Bracelet and may not feel
harmed by the bogus claim. 62 Experiencing a placebo effect may stop the
consumer, a willing and hopeful believer, from even attempting to verify the
52 
Id
5 Judge Easterbrook heard echoes of these peddlers of yore but did not take the analogy quite as
far. "Far better a placebo that causes no harm (the Q-Ray Ionized Bracelet is inert) than the sort of
nostrums peddled from the back of a wagon 100 years ago and based on alcohol, opium, and wormwood."
FTC v. QT, Inc., 512 F.3d 858, 863 (7th Cir. 2008); see ANN ANDERSON, SNAKE OIL, HUSTLERS AND
HAMBONES: THE AMERICAN MEDICINE SHOW 1-2,7 (2000) (describing the influence of English quacks
of the American medicine show).
54 512 F.3d at 858.
" Id. at 859.
56 Id. at 860.
17 Id (positing that the trial court found that "there are no such things" as "Q-Rays").
ss Id. at 862-63.
9 Id at 862.
` Id at 860.
6 1 Id at 863.
62 Id at 862-63.
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efficacy of the bracelet. Even the consumer wishing to verify efficacy
requires access to scientific testing, which consumers typically lack. As
Easterbrook concluded:
Why pay $200 for a Q-Ray ionized Bracelet when you can get
relief from an aspirin tablet that costs 10? Some painful
conditions do not respond to analgesics (or the stronger drugs
in the pharmacopeia) or to surgery, but it does not follow that
a placebo at any price is better. Deceit such as the tall tales . .
. about the Q-Ray Ionized Bracelet will lead some consumers
to avoid treatments that cost less and do more; the lies will lead
others to pay too much for pain relief or otherwise interfere
with the matching of remedies to medical conditions . . . .
Doctor Dulcamara was a charlatan who harmed most of his
customers even though Nemorino gets the girl at the end of
Donizetti's L'elisir d'amore.63
An operatic reference aside, Easterbrook describes the essence of the
resource misallocation that results from a transaction rooted in a false
credence claim. "One important reason for requiring truth is so that
competition in the market will lead to appropriate prices. Selling brass as
gold harms consumers independent of any effect on pain." 64 In other words,
false credence claims preempt efficient transactions, yielding market failure,
thus reducing social welfare. Honest sellers lose business and fade from the
market, unless the credence claims can be countered or regulators intervene.
As noted, the recent Volkswagen scandal offers a stark example of a
false credence claim. As part of a broad scheme, Volkswagen ran a
widespread advertising campaign to promote the low-emissions virtues of
its new diesel models.6 1 In sum, the manufacturer claimed that these diesel
models were "fun, quiet, efficient and, most critically . .. clean. In essence,
Volkswagen told drivers they could have their cake and eat it." 6 6 These
claims allegedly enabled the company to charge consumers a substantial
premium for these models.67 Volkswagen marketed the advantages of Clean
Diesel technology with this narrative: "Stinky, smoky, and sluggish. Those
old diesel realities no longer apply. Enter TDI Clean Diesel. Ultra-low-sulfur
fuel, direct injection technology, and extreme efficiency. We've ushered in
a new era of diesel."6 8
6 Id at 863.
6 id
61 Mouawad & Ember, supra note 1.
6 Id.
67 Complaint at 2-3, Fiol v. Volkswagen Grp. of Am., Inc., No. 13-cv-3072-EMC (N.D. Cal. Sept.
18, 2015).
6 TDI@ Clean Diesel, VOLKSWAGEN (July 5,2015, 1:25 PM), http://www.vw.com/features/clean-
diesel/ [https://web.archive.org/web/20150529074022/].
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Volkswagen's claims allegedly reflected willful behavior. Unlike many
credence claims which may simply lack support, the company expended
great effort to obstruct consumer and regulatory verification of the claim. 9
Only advanced testing performed by the non-profit International Council on
Clean Transportation (ICCT) formed the basis for concluding that
Volkswagen employed a "defeat device" to defeat routine emissions
testing.70 The ICCT provided damning evidence to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and the California Air Resources Board." The
EPA then fully uncovered Volkswagen's elaborate scheme to program
vehicles' computer systems to defeat emissions tests.72
Instead of "ushering in a new era of diesel," Volkswagen ushered in an
era of self-inflicted nightmarish public relations,73 damage to its brand, 74
hundreds of class actions to defend, 75 and a monstrous financial burden76
deemed an "[e]xistential [t]hreat" 77 to the company. Despite multi-agency
attention and the private lawsuits, United States Senator Bill Nelson urged
the FTC to pursue the underlying deceptive advertising practices, noting that
"Congress did not contemplate a bystander role for the agency in the face of
" Jeffrey Liker, Assessing the Sins of Volkswagen, Toyota, and General Motors, HARV. Bus. REV.
(Sept. 24, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/09/assessing-the-sins-of-volkswagen-toyota-and-general-motors
[https://permacc/A3NA-EREU] ("[T]he company's engineers intentionally added software designed to
allow its diesel engines to evade emissions standards and then, in normal driving, emit 40 times the
acceptable levels. This was a deliberate, and quite ingenious, way to break the law and avoid detection.").
o Harry Kretchmer, The Man Who Discovered the Volkswagen Emissions Scandal, BBC (Oct. 13,
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-34519184 [https://perma.cc/WC78-9ESB].
7 Id.
72 Hotten, supra note 1 (explaining that the nitrogen-oxide emissions from these vehicles exceeded
the regulatory limit by a factor of forty).
13 See Tonya Garcia, Volkswagen's PR Response Made Problems Worse, Experts Say,
MARKETWATCH (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/volkswagens-pr-response-made-
problems-worse-experts-say-2015-09-25 [https://perma.cc/29VV-7K9Z] (discussing how Volkswagen's
slow and subtle response to the scandal made a bad situation worse).
7 See William Boston, Volkswagen Seeks to Rebuild Trust with U.S. Initiative, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
8, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/volkswagen-seeks-to-rebuild-trust-with-u-s-initiative-
1446995472 [https://perma.cc/EM6L-CYRP] (discussing Volkswagen's struggle to regain control of its
message).
" See Alison Frankel, In VW Class Actions, Three Trial Judges Are Raring to Go, REUTERS (NOV.
5, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2015/11/05/in-vw-class-actions-three-trial-judges-are-
raring-to-go/ [https://perma.cc/A4N5-XFVT] (noting that, as ofNovember 5, 2015, consumers had filed
approximately 350 class actions against Volkswagen with courts sorting out the multi-district litigation
challenges).
7 See Alanna Petroff, Volkswagen Scandal May Cost Up to $87 Billion, CNN (Oct. 2, 2015),
http://money.cnn.com/2015/10/02/news/companies/volkswagen-scandal-bp-credit-suisse/
[https://perma.cc/ZD5F-LB6X] (explaining that the financial impact may exceed that of the Deepwater
Horizon disaster to BP).
n Patrick Donahue, Volkswagen Chief Warns on Existential Threat of Cheating Scandal,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-04/volkswagen-chief-
warns-of-existential-threat-of-cheating-scandal [https://perma.cc/8E4Y-9F3P].
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galling and unmitigated consumer deception."
On October 2015, the FTC acknowledged commencement of an
investigation into Volkswagen's practices, in coordination with the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the EPA.79 The FTC filed a complaint
against Volkswagen in March 20160 and, along with California, reached a
broad, historic settlementi that could ultimately require the company to
spend $14.7 billion.82
Consumers, especially after successful testing through state emissions
tests, would have no reason to doubt Volkswagen's clean diesel claim, and
consumers might have expected regulators to verify such a claim. 83 The
Volkswagen example shows that consumers standing alone would have
great difficulty detecting false credence claims, justifying a higher level of
regulatory scrutiny. (But for the engineer at ICCT, Volkswagen may never
have been caught or would have been caught much later.) Consumers have
little incentive and lack the ability to police these sorts of credence claims;
regulators, however, have much more facility.
A systemic, deliberate focus on credence claims could help the FTC
approach enforcement with a more defined structure and more efficiency
and effectiveness. Troublesome credence claims typically evoke instances
like the Q-Ray, Clean Diesel, or the classic medicine show-claims that
draw attention because consumers have difficulty verifying the claims,
leading to resource misallocations like Judge Easterbrook described.84 Other
credence claims that might prove impossible or impractical to verify include
origin of a product or its sourcing (e.g., "Made in America," or "This is the
product of recycled materials").
Refining enforcement by classifying deceptive-discounting cases as
7 Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. Commerce, Sci., & Transp., Lawmaker Wants Feds to
Investigate Volkswagen Marketing (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/
index.cfim/pressreleases?ID-AO4FC141-A8A4-4B7D-Bl9B-3C33C97A899E [https://perma.cc/P5ZV-
YFPL).
" David McLaughlin & Alan Katz, Volkswagen's Advertising of Rigged Diesels Probed by F7C,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-14/volkswagen-s-
advertising-of-rigged-diesels-probed-by-ftc [https://perma.cc/57T5-NJBB].
o Complaint for Permanent Injunction & Other Equitable Relief at 1, FTC v. Volkswagen Grp. of
Am., 2016 WL 1221625 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29,2016).
" Partial Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction & Monetary Judgment at I1, In re Volkswagen
Clean Diesel Practices, No. 3:15-md-2672 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 28, 2016); Bill Chappell, Volkswagen Will
Pay U.S. Diesel Car Owners Up to $10 Billion, NPR (June 28, 2016, 11:04 AM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/06/28/483785166/volkswagen-will-pay-u-s-diesel-car-
owners-up-to-10-billion [https://perma.cc/6WNA-FGDP].
82 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Volkswagen to Spend up to $14.7 Billion to Settle
Allegations of Cheating Emissions Tests and Deceiving Customers on 2.0 Liter Diesel Vehicles (June
28, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/06/volkswagen-spend-147-billion-
settle-allegations-cheating [https://perma.cc/T8QB-FPUY].
83 See Kretchmer, supra note 70 (explaining that Volkswagen deceived a large group of technically
skilled regulators until one engineer at the ICCT became curious).
8 FTC v. QT, Inc., 512 F.3d 858, 863 (7th Cir. 2008); Darby & Karni, supra note 18, at 68-72.
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credence claims would demonstrate use of the SEC framework to provide
structure and more efficiency to federal enforcement. Easterbrook's concern
about market disruption from a credence claim representing "brass as gold"
should also logically hold for a price that is falsely represented as lower than
a defined benchmark. Since 1969, the FTC has not accorded pricing
credence claims an appropriate level of concern. 6 Though not as spectacular
as Volkswagen, deceptions of the same nature take place every day, in the
form of deceptive retail pricing, and the FTC has decidedly taken a
"bystander role," to use Senator Nelson's words. 87
4. The Overlap Between Experience and Credence.
Claims occasionally overlap SEC categories, and my content analysis of
FTC enforcement in Section II reveals as much. As Darby and Karni
explained, "The line between experience and credence qualities of a good
may not be always sharp, particularly if the quality will be discerned in use,
but only after the lapse of a considerable period of time.""
For example, a face-cream manufacturer's claim that the product will
prevent future wrinkles will not reveal efficacy until time passes. Such
claims, if false, prove harmful due to the cost of the failed experience-in
the form of losses from repeated purchases and the delay in use of other
potentially effective products during the evaluation period. Efficacy may be
difficult to verify over the longer period of time, even if no wrinkles appear.
The consumer may never know whether wrinkles would have appeared in
the absence of using the face cream. This type of claim offers some ability
to verify, but not complete ability, rendering it a hybrid.
In sum, sorting advertising claims into the SEC categories brings rigor
to regulatory prioritization. On a broad level, monitoring search claims
offers a low return on intervention costs because consumers can police their
search. Experience claims present different levels of concern, depending on
the nature of the offering. If the cost of a negative experience proves high,
more monitoring and enforcement of the claims should follow. Some
deceptive experience claims can prove costly and unavoidable to consumers.
The return on regulatory intervention would be higher. Credence claims
8 QT, Inc., 512 F.3d at 863.
86 See generally Friedman, Fictitious Pricing, supra note 3, at 937-41, 952-56 (exploring history
and deficiencies in FTC approach to pricing claims). States have occasionally accorded due concern to
pricing-credence claims, however. See id at 924, n. 16. A recent example came in December 2016, when
the Los Angeles, California city attorney sued four national retailers for alleging they used "false
reference pricing" to mislead consumers. Los Angeles City Attorney Mike Feuer Sues Four Major
National Retailers, Alleging False Reference Pricing; J.C. Penney, Kohl's, Macy's and Sears Allegedly
Misled Customers With Pricing Schemes to Increase Sales, L.A. CITY ATTORNEY (December 8, 2016),
http://www.lacityattorney.org/single-post/2016/12/08/Los-Angeles-City-Attorney-Mike-Feuer-Sues-
Four-Major-National-Retailers-Alleging-False-Reference-Pricing-JC-Penney-Koh%E2'/%80%99s-
MacyE2%80%99s-and-Sears-Allegedly-Misled-Customers-With-Pricing-Schemes-to-Increase-Sales
[https://perma.cc/6TJS-LWA3].
U.S. Senate Comm. Commerce, Sci., & Transp., supra note 78.
Darby & Kami, supra note 18, at 69.
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render consumers more vulnerable and potentially lead to market failure,
justifying a higher level of resource allocation.
Defining the categories-and determining which claims belong in
which category-helps refine the cost-benefit analysis of regulatory
intervention in deceptive advertising. In the next section, I offer more
examples of SEC claims and how regulators should address them.
B. Regulatory Engagement with Advertising Claims
As noted above, sellers can simultaneously make multiple SEC claims
about a single offering. In refining enforcement, regulators should engage
these claims in a nuanced way in order to establish a more effective
prioritization scheme and optimize enforcement. To clarify further the
differences between the types of SEC claims embedded within an offering
and how regulators should address them, in this Section, I present three
examples of different offerings: a low-ticket item, a high-ticket item, and a
medium-ticket item with an advertised sale price.
Consider the following illustration related to the purchase of pork
products from the hypothetical "Acme Pork Farms" pork-chop producer.89
Table I shows that when buying a simple pork chop at the supermarket,
consumers may confront all three SEC claims.
Table 1- Acme Pork Chop
The category: "pork chop," the Acme
Search claims brand, the price, weight, and visible fat (as
shown through the packaging).
A label on the package: "Tastes flavorful
Experience claims and succulent!"
Origin: "Acme only sources from humaneCredence claims ,mI farms.
Each of these claims engages shoppers in a different way. Consumers
can easily compare price and fattiness against other pork products in the
meat bin. At the supermarket, the costs of verifying and inspecting search
claims are low. Competitors and regulators might be concerned with brand
counterfeiting, which would interfere with search, but that concern only
matters for consumers if the brand signals value or a certain quality. 90 With
" Esben Sloth Andersen et al., The Evolution ofCredence Goods in Customer Markets: Exchanging
'Pigs in Pokes,' at 3 (ResearchGate, Working Paper, 1998), https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/267402623_The evolutionofcredencegoods in customer_
marketsexchanging'pigs inpokes [https://perma.cc/H6ZD-R78P].
9 Other products, like premium-brand fashion items, prove more susceptible to counterfeiting.
However, premium fashion brands may not choose to police this problem. See Jonathan M. Barnett,
Essay, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Reflections on Status Consumption, Intellectual Property,
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minimal effort, consumers can resolve any disparity between these search
claims and the actual offering characteristics prior to a purchase. The need
for regulatory monitoring and intervention would be low.
Shoppers can buy the Acme pork chop and determine through
experience whether the chops were as "flavorful" or "succulent" as
advertised. If they were decidedly not, shoppers could decline to repeat this
purchase and, if motivated, could share their experience with others. Though
the consumer would surrender the initial expenditure on the pork chops and
endure a subpar meal, the consumer loss would likely be small. Regulators
could deprioritize their concerns about the flavor-succulence claims,
deferring to consumers to react to the claim and correct the market. Also of
note, if the consumer wished to invest in advance investigation of the pork-
chop experience, peer reviews might be one touch of a smartphone away.
But the smaller the ticket, the smaller the potential payoff from any advance
time investment.
With respect to credence, some consumers might either pay a premium
for or switch to humane-sourced Acme pork because they want to uphold a
moral point of view,91 or because "humane" might be a stand-in for overall
quality.92 Consumers are ill-equipped, however, to assess whether the
offering fulfills a "humane" claim. Humanely produced pork products might
not taste distinguishably different from those generated by the cruelest,
lawful means of production. Consumers cannot detect this problem through
search or through consumption experience. A test could be performed
through third-party certification (which would presumably have been on the
label, effectively rendering it a credence claim about a credence claim) or
through an expensive private investigation of the slaughterhouse.
Regulators, who have both access and expertise, may be best positioned to
evaluate the "humane-farm" sourcing claim.93
The "inhumane" (but humane-claiming) pork producer might have an
edge over the honest, humane producer in the form of lower processing costs
and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV. 1381, 1381-82 (2012) (describing how, even without robust
enforcement of intellectual property rights, the fashion industry sustains robust investment in new
product development). However, some evidence exists that consumers are rarely deceived by this type
of counterfeiting. Id at 1383.
" See Craig J. Thompson & Gokeen Coskuner-Balli, Countervailing Market Responses to
Corporate Co-optation and the Ideological Recruitment of Consumption Communities, 34 J. CONS. RES.
135 (2007) (describing how a consumer's visceral sense of personal commitment and moral conviction
reinforces the credibility of an unconventional pricing structure).
92 See Humane Eating, HUMANE Soc'y, http://www.humanesociety.org/issues/eating/
[https://perma.cc/Y366-HPUE] (last visited Sept. 30, 2016) (espousing the view that humane
consumption is generally healthier).
" The FTC came to this conclusion about misleading environmental attribute claims
("greenwashing") and tightened guidance in 2012. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Issues
Revised "Green Guides" (Oct. 1, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/10/ftc-
issues-revised-green-guides [https://perma.cc/6E4Q-KRSDI.
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that could translate into higher margins, lower prices, or both. In addition to
consumers being misled, systemic resource misallocation results, as honest
competitors struggle.
Consumers cannot easily correct for this type of information problem.
Competitors could challenge each other's claims, either through rebuttals or
counterclaims in the market or private lawsuits,94 but such efforts might
prove expensive and a plaintiff might be capturing a benefit for all
competitors while bearing the cost alone. With this sort of credence claim,
regulators must intervene because they are the only players positioned to
correct the market.
The net benefit of monitoring and enforcing credence claims weighs
more heavily than the benefit of enforcing search claims and low-ticket,
verifiable experience claims. Though, of course, all credence claims vary
and must in turn be weighed against each other to determine regulatory
priority.
A high-ticket item, less-frequently purchased, also can carry multiple
SEC claims and surface enforcement priorities. Consider the hypothetical
example of the purchase of an expensive kitchen appliance, an "Acme
Refrigerator," in Table 2.95
Table 2- Acme Refrigerator
Category: "Refrigerator," Acme brand,
Search claims price, warranty, and visible features (size,
compartments, ice dispenser).
Acme refrigerators labeled "efficient and
Experience durable."
Acme refrigerators are "hand-inspected
Credence before leaving factory" and "Acme refrigerators
are Swiss-engineered."
In this example, search claims remain straightforward. A consumer can
easily inspect the visible features of the refrigerator and verify the search
claims. For a big-ticket, long-term purchase, a consumer might find a greater
return to time investment in incremental shopping.
For an item like a refrigerator, however, experience claims might prove
tougher for the consumer to verify than in the pork hypothetical. If the pork
tastes awful, the low-cost expenditure can be written off easily. For a
refrigerator, once purchased, delivered, and installed, and after limited-
warranty expiration, the cost of a failed experience weighs heavier.
Although "experience" claims related to efficiency could be verified by
"borrowed" experience from peer or third-party reviews, or energy
9 B. Sanfield, Inc. v. Finlay Fine Jewelry Corp., 258 F.3d 578, 582 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming
judgment where a small retailer failed to prove a competitor's fictitious comparative pricing).
" Nelson cites appliances as an example. Nelson, Information, supra note 9, at 312.
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regulators, consumers might find "durability" difficult to verify. An
experience claim of durability beyond warranty takes years to evaluate and
consumers cannot practically correct the claim in a timely way with a refusal
to repurchase.96 The consumer lacks the ability, and generally the
knowledge, to inspect the refrigerator's inner mechanics to assess long-term
durability, and also the consumer likely will not find it worthwhile to hire a
professional appliance mechanic to disassemble and inspect the item.
The refrigerator credence claims have similarities to the pork claims.
The consumers seeking Swiss design or hand-inspection might find these
attributes material to their purchase but impossible to verify personally. The
typical consumer would, at the very least, need to recruit someone to visit
the factory or design center. Realistically, only regulators (or well-informed
plaintiffs' attorneys during discovery) could have the ability to verify and
correct a false claim here, as was the case with Volkswagen. These credence
examples may prove more market-distortive in the cost-benefit analysis than
the experience claim, but only a well-developed analytical framework would
compel that rigorous evaluation. That evaluation would yield a set of
enforcement priorities.
To demonstrate that price can be a credence claim, as well as a search
claim, compare this example of an offering made in the Acme Clothing Store
for an Acme Coat illustrated in Table 3.
Table 3
Acme brand, price, and visible features (color,
Search claims fabric, cut, size).
Price tag: 50% off [originally $1201
Acme coats keep the wearer warm and are
Experience drbedurable.
Credence Acme coats are "Made in America."
With search, the consumer can readily inspect the coat and try it on to
see if the color and cut pleases and if the fabric has the right texture. Some
of the experience attributes can be tested by trying on the coat to feel the
weight and inspect the workmanship of the sewing up close. Some
experience claims can be "borrowed" from peers through online product
reviews.
With respect to "Made in America" claims, Congress amended the FTC
' Even a professional third-party review of a new product could not offer completely reliable
information about performance in the long term. Differentiations in automobile reliability ratings from
the methodologies of J.D. Power and Consumer Reports demonstrate the challenges of predicting future
performance even for well-established models of automobiles. See Cheryl Jensen, Why Consumer
Reports and JD. Power are so Diferent, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2012),
http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/30/why-consumer-reports-and-j-d-power-are-so-different/
[https://perma-cclRPV6-5JAF].
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Act to address origin claims,97 which would likely not have been necessary
(though still politically expedient) if origin was verifiable by consumers. A
consumer would need to investigate a manufacturer's supply chain to
confirm this claim, or would need to rely on regulators, whistleblowers, or
perhaps even investigative journalists to prove or disprove origin.9 8
The price claim starkly differs from other plain search claims in this
illustration. If the price had been purely displayed as $60, rather than as a
50% discount from $120, the price claim would fall into the category of a
straightforward search claim. The representation of the absolute price
enables comparison and assessment of the exchange.
However, when presented as a discount, price takes on the
characteristics of a credence claim. Discounts imply bargains. The time and
effort required for tracking the price history of an impulse purchase, to see
if the item had been offered at a value twice that of the price offered in the
instant case, proves expensive to acquire and verify. The sheer magnitude of
the claim about price may induce the consumer to rely on it.
What is the harm to the consumer from buying at a falsely-advertised
discount? At first blush, the answer might appear to be none, given that the
consumer paid an absolute price at the cash register, rendering expectation
damages a curious remedy. 99
If the deceit induces a transaction, a socially destructive dynamic
emerges. The advertised price discount may induce the consumer into
thinking that he has found a "bargain," and he may stop shopping sooner. 00
Buyers have finite time for shopping, and when they come across what
appears to be a bargain, evidence shows that the returns from additional price
search appear to the consumer to be too low to justify shopping further.i'o
This sort of price information, if true, would produce a more efficient
transactional process.
However, if the advertised discount induces discontinuation of shopping
based on a false former price, the search may be stunted prematurely. This
leads to a market failure much like the one of which Judge Easterbrook
warned, where the market does not yield "appropriate prices."'02 If the
consumer believes that he has struck a bargain at $60 because of its falsely
advertised presentation as a discount, this fictitious pricing will, according
" See 15 U.S.C. § 45a (2012) (granting the FTC permission to regulate origin claims of products
with a "Made in the U.S.A." or "Made in America" label, or the equivalent thereof).
9 For an example of a successful origin claim public action, see Kwikset Corp. v. Sup. Ct., 246
P.3d 877, 901 (Cal. 2011) (finding that a plaintiff had standing to challenge Kwikset's label claim that
its locksets were of domestic origin).
" For a discussion of the role of expectation damages in fictitious-pricing cases and how they vary
by state, compare Hinojos v. Kohl's Corp., 718 F.3d 1098, 1107 (9th Cir. 2013), with Kim v. Carter's
Inc., 598 F.3d 362, 365-66 (7th Cir. 2010).
" See Grewal & Compeau, supra note 32, at 55 ("[T]he higher the overall perception of value, the
greater the willingness to buy and the lower the likelihood of additional price search.").
12t Id.
102 FTC v. QT, Inc., 512 F.3d 858, 863 (7th Cir. 2008).
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to the consensus of the literature, lead to welfare reduction.
A market failure can be prevented with an artful market intervention,
but with fictitious pricing, the FTC has long decided not to intervene to
correct this information problem. From a cost-benefit perspective, ordinary
search claims should not be a high priority because they will self-correct. A
buyer can spot certain characteristics of the coat and the market can sort out
any mismatching claims easily.
Ordinarily, price falls into this search category-but when price
incorporates a discount with reference to a prior price, it no longer should.
Generally, a buyer has to approach an advertised prior-reference-point
discount like a credence claim. Buyers have no readily available way of
knowing whether the claim about the price was made in good faith.
Verifying a prior-reference-point claim cannot be done through pure
experience, unless the consumer invests in tracking the price of the specific
item at a specific retailer to see if future discount claims are accurate. The
cost of experiential investigation, at best, appears to be a low-return time
investment.
Categorizing advertised discount-pricing claims as credence claims,
distinguished from straightforward, verifiable "search" claims, reflects the
distinction between the advertising messages. This recategorization also
clarifies why the FTC should shift priorities to scrutinize prior-reference-
point discount advertising generally.
Over the past thirty years, the FTC has deliberately shifted toward
applying cost-benefit analysis to prioritizing deceptive advertising
enforcement.'o3 Removing discount-pricing claims from the search category
and placing them in the credence category-where they belong-justifies
the elevation of regulatory scrutiny. The cost-benefit approach can be
enhanced not only by applying the SEC framework but also by revisiting old
conclusions about the true nature of traditional claims.
If the FTC treats discount-price claims like credence claims, that policy
posture will lead to more scrutiny of discounting practices. In Section II, I
sample recent FTC enforcement actions, showing that the FTC generally
focuses enforcement on credence claims. By discussing the FTC actions
within the context of the SEC framework, I show how further structuring
and formalization of cost-benefit analysis can lead to more efficient
stewardship of enforcement resources.
II. THE FTC Focus ON CREDENCE CLAIMS: EMPIRICAL SUPPORT
An analysis of recent FTC deceptive-advertising enforcement actions
reveals that the FTC currently focuses on enforcement of credence claims.
Though the FTC actively enforces all three types of SEC claims, the most
103 See infra Section IV.B.
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common claims enforced fall into the credence category, or straddle the
enforcement and credence categories.' 04 As such, a more targeted,
deliberate, and formal emphasis on categorizing and monitoring credence
claims would leverage a familiar baseline for structured enforcement.
In 1974, Nelson examined which types of advertising claims the FTC
enforced, sorting them by the original two categories of product attributes
he devised-search and experience.'o His conclusion, based on a data set of
fifty-eight FTC enforcement actions sourced from the Federal Trade
Commission Reporter, revealed that the FTC focused exclusively on
experience claims, as he then defined them.106 Because credence claims and
experience claims often overlap, it is likely that if one were to sort out
Nelson's non-search claims, many of them would be categorized as
credence.
To explore whether the FTC's enforcement priorities remained stable
since Nelson's approach over forty years ago,'0o I sorted through all of the
FTC enforcement actions between July 1, 2014 and June 30, 2015 to
characterize the types of claims the FTC pursued.'io This recent profile of
federal enforcement reveals that today the FTC focuses on credence claims
and especially claims that span experience and credence. A number of
claims, as I show in Table 4, fell into both experience and credence, but
nearly two-thirds of the claims that the FTC pursued had a credence
characteristic.
Table 4: Federal Trade Commission Advertising Activity (July
2014 - June 2015) by Claim Type
Type of Claim Number Identified
Search (only) 5
Search and Experience 2
Experience (only) 7
Experience and Credence 15
Credence (only) 9
This examination also reflects that the FTC enforces advertising claims
sparingly and selectively. During this one-year time period, I counted a mere
'" See infra Table 4.
'05 Nelson, Advertising, supra note 9, at 750.
10
6 Id.
0' Note that Nelson studied enforcement actions from 1965, which stretched back before the FTC
enacted the economic-analysis reforms I describe in detail in Section IV. See id.
"o I searched the Federal Trade Commission Reporter in Westlaw from the period of July 1, 2014,
through June 30, 2015, using "advertising" as the primary filter. I included all advertising claims that the
FTC confronted during this period, including complaints and orders, and investigations concluding with
no-action letters. If the claims at issue appeared as part of multiple filings, I consolidated them and only
counted them once. The database created to capture and code this data is on file with the author.
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thirty-eight pure, separate, discernable instances of federal advertising-
claims-enforcement activity. Given that total domestic advertising spending
likely exceeded $180 billion for 2015,109 this number of FTC actions appears
modest, even accounting for any state-level regulation, private civil actions,
and other interventions. Because regulatory resources are limited, informed
rebalancing of federal enforcement efforts against information activity of
that value could have substantial impact. A tightened, orderly framework,
expressly employed and properly implemented, would assist the FTC in
guiding efforts toward the areas of greatest social concern. Put simply, the
FTC could get more "bang for its buck."
Exploring actual examples of recent federal advertising enforcement
shows how the FTC, in essence, already uses the SEC framework-but does
so without the formal structure that would enable superior resource
stewardship. Of course, fictitious-pricing cases are conspicuously absent
from this data set. Enforcement of fictitious-pricing cases as credence claims
would, however, fit the types of cases that the FTC focuses on today, thus
providing one example of how a deliberate application of the SEC
framework could build on and improve the Commission's current approach.
A. Search Claim Enforcement Examples
Advertisers have a lower incentive to invest in disseminating
questionable search claims because consumers can surface any facial
disparities either pre-purchase or at the point of purchase. Natural consumer
empowerment at this stage should, as a matter of policy, lead regulators
away from scrutinizing search claims toward other types of claims that
involve less transparency. However, as Nelson notes, even within the
provision of search information, "[m]isleading advertising will still exist."'i
Due to the readily verifiable nature of the claims and the costs of
misleading claims, "consumers can have some confidence that the
advertising of search qualities bears a close relation to the truth.""' This is
not to say that consumers believe that all search claims are credible, but they
have more confidence in these claims as opposed to experience and credence
claims." 2
Consistent with this supposition, the FTC sparingly enforces actions
where search claims form the basis of the claim in controversy. However,
some search claims can still deceive consumers. Recent actions show that
the FTC pursues cases of complex pricing misrepresentation involving big-
'09 Total US Ad Spending to See Largest Increase Since 2004, EMARKETER (July 2, 2014),
http://www.emarketer.com/Article/Total-US-Ad-Spending-See-Largest-ncrease-Since-2004/1010982
[https://perma.ccZ8NR-E9AA].
o Nelson, Advertising, supra note 9, at 730.
'Id
11 2 Id.
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ticket items like automobiles 1 13 and associated big-ticket lending and
financing.' 14 One of these prosecutions involved an auto dealership's
practice of advertising prices that the dealership would not honor, a classic
disruption of the search process."
Nonetheless, some of these pricing claims, particularly the ones
involving complex payment plans for automobiles that misrepresent
consumer savings, might also be appropriately classifiable (secondarily) as
experience or credence claims. If consumers took the time to measure their
savings on these advertised financing plans, they could correct subsequent
transactions based on experience, although concededly only after incurring
a large expense. Given that some consumers may not have the incentive or
the ability to verify the claim, even at the time of entering the payment plan,
the claim may have credence characteristics. Put simply, some consumers
may make the deal and simply move forward, realizing that undoing the deal
would prove difficult anyway.
With respect to basic deceptive-pricing claims, especially claims of the
sort that might serve to lure a customer into a car dealership, and ultimately
a sale, on false pretenses, the search category likely still matches.
Intervention can be justified, even in the low-scrutiny, search-claim sphere,
because behavioral consumer biases are exploited to lure in the consumer,
leading to suboptimal transactions that reduce welfare."' The consumer may
be lured in by the attractive financing offer and may continue with the
complex transaction because of the perception that they have already
invested time into the deal and into the relationship with the salesperson.
Consumer innumeracy presents another opportunity for sellers to exploit
search."'
Concededly, the regulatory cost-benefit calculus might not operate
simply on addressing the specific price-advertising method. The FTC, in this
case, may have viewed this matter as an effort to regulate a specific industry
practice, the automobile-dealer industry, rather than addressing a retail
pricing practice across the entire retail market.
The FTC should have a lower level of concern about search claims
because markets can more readily police search claims. Experience claims
offer a different array of problems for the FTC. Though pricing, particularly
'3 For pricing-related complaints and orders against automobile dealers, see TT of Longwood, Inc.,
2015 WL 1518895 (F.T.C. Mar. 27, 2015); City Nissan, Inc., 159 F.T.C. 1760 (2015); Jim Burke Auto.,
Inc., 159 F.T.C. 1793 (2015).
114 For complaints and orders related to financing representations, see Matt Blatt Inc., 2015 WL
1518892 (F.T.C. Mar. 26, 2015); Nat'l Payment Network, Inc., 159 F.T.C. 1718 (2015).
". TC Dealership, L.P., 2015 WL 4035223 (F.T.C. June 29, 2015).
"
6 See Friedman, Bait-and-Switch, supra note 27, at 586-89 (explaining how the sunk-cost fallacy
conjured by bait-and-switch tactics will lead consumers to make inefficient choices, and how bait-and-
switch, if left unchecked, drives honest players from the market).
1' See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure ofMandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L.
REv. 647, 676-77, 711-14, 721-22 (2011) (discussing the barrier presented by consumer innumeracy in
generating successful mandatory disclosure laws).
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of a long-term retail contract, can have experiential dimensions, in practice,
search should generally provide the instant ability to obtain this information
up front.
B. Experience Claim Enforcement Examples
Nelson observed that compared to search characteristics, consumers
lacked the instant ability to assess experience characteristics. In 1974, when
Nelson wrote about the experience attribute, which encompassed what
Darby and Karni would later call credence, he noted that consumers would
have to purchase and use a product at least once in order to assess the
accuracy of a claim."' The primary correction mechanism for consumers for
a false or deceptive experience claim would be to return the item, if possible,
or simply not to purchase it again. Information might stream to other buyers
and competitors to devalue an overinflated claim, devaluing the incentive
for the seller to continue to invest in the claim.
In recent years, the FTC has demonstrated heightened concern about
experience claims. For example, the FTC tightened guidance on the use of
testimonial endorsementsil9 and has required product reviewers to disclose
whether they received the reviewed offering for free in exchange for the
publicity.'2 0 Independent peer-to-peer reviews, if negative, function as
negative experience claims, powerful to the point where they have become
the subject of defamation suits.12 ' These suits have even warranted the
reviewing platform Yelp to lobby for legislative protection (in the form of
anti-SLAPP laws) to shield users from such actions.1 22
During the period I examined, consistent with these concerns about
experience claims, the FTC enforced actions against those offering
deceptive "borrowed experience" claims, including falsely generated online
reviews that appeared to be from peers 23 and peer reviews generated
".. Nelson, Advertising, supra note 9, at 730.
"' Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Advertising, 74 Fed. Reg.
53,124 (Oct. 15, 2009) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 255).
20 16 C.F.R. §§ 255.1(d), 255.5 (2015).
121 See e.g., Hassell v. Bird, 247 Cal. App. 4th 1336 (2016), pet. for rev. granted, 381 P.3d 231
(Cal. 2016) (defamation case brought by attorney against client for client's derogatory remarks in Yelp
review, along with an order to Yelp to remove review); Seaton v. TripAdvisor, LLC, 728 F.3d 592 (6th
Cir. 2013) (resort owner unsuccessfully sued TripAdvisor for defamation). TripAdvisor put the resort on
a list: "Dirtiest Hotels-United States," accompanied by a reviewer's picture of a torn bedspread with
the quote, "There was dirt at least 1/2" thick in the bathtub, which was filled with lots of dark hair.") Id.
at 598-99.
122 Angus Loten, Yelp Reviews Brew a Fight over Free Speech vs. Fairness, WALL. ST. J. (Apr. 2,
2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SBl0001424052702303847804579477633444768964 [https://
perma.cc/FWG7-F9DF].
123 Sony Comput. Entn't Am. LLC, 159 F.T.C. 1127 (2015); Deutsch LA, Inc., 159 F.T.C. 1163,
1168-70 (2015); see Lesley Fair, Game Over: FTC Challenges Sony's Claims for PlayStation Vita and
Tweets by Deutsch LA, FED. TRADE COMM'N Bus. BLOG (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.itc.gov/news-
events/blogs/business-blog/2014/1 1/game-over-fic-challenges-sonys-claims-playstation-vita
862 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:837
REFINING ADVERTISING REGULATION
through undisclosed incentives. 124 The fact that advertisers will go to some
length to influence, or even manufacture, peer endorsements speaks to their
power. Extra credibility attaches to an experience claim when a similarly
situated, neutral consumer delivers the message. The FTC, by taking action
and promulgating stricter guidelines in this area, has signaled that the
benefits of intervention in this zone exceed the costs.
Though I have discussed the power of the "borrowed" experience, direct
experience appears to be addressed more frequently, but typically in
conjunction with a credence claim. The line between an experience claim
and a credence claim depends on the ease of consumer verification. If a
degree of reasonable investigation can verify a claim, an element of the
"experience" claim is present. But if a claim proves excessively prohibitive,
highly improbable, or even impossible to verify, the claim looks more like a
credence claim. Occasionally, this line blurs, or the line's blurry definition
may depend on a range of consumer appetites for investing in verification of
the claim.
C. Blended Experience-Credence Claim Enforcement Examples
Some claims inherently belong in both categories of experience and
credence because the claim might prove partially verifiable. For a recent
enforcement example, consider a claim that a substance will repel lice from
human hair,' 25 which might be verifiable through experience if a consumer
finds himself free of lice after using the product. Certainly, if lice persisted,
the experience claim would be disproven. However, if lice never returned, it
might prove difficult for the consumer to definitively verify whether the
product delivered that experience or whether the lice would have stayed
away anyway. This "lice repellence" claim projects into the future, surfacing
the "credence" attributes of the claim.
The FTC recently addressed other claims similar to the lice-repellence
claim, including blended experience-credence claims involving weight-loss
products,'26 including caffeine-laced weight-loss "pants"127 and memory-
enhancement supplements.1 2 8
As my analysis of recent FTC enforcement demonstrates, nearly half of
all actions straddle both experience and credence claims.' 29 For another
[https://perma.cc/5PBX-HZ7F] ("[Deutsch] had employees post rave tweets about the PS Vita without
disclosing their connection to Deutsch or Sony.").
124 Amerifreight, Inc., 159 F.T.C. 1626 (2015).
125 Lornamead, Inc., 2014 WL 4740172 (F.T.C. Sept. 16,2014).
126 John Matthew Dwyer 111, 2014 WL 5474620 (F.T.C. Oct. 22, 2014); Fed. Trade Comm'n,
Opinion Letter on FTC v. Genesis Today, Inc. (Jan. 27, 2015), 2015 WL 399862 (statement of
Chairwoman Edith Ramirez, Comm'r Julie Brill, and Comm'r Terrell McSweeny).
127 Wacoal Am., Inc., 2014 WL 5906525 (F.T.C. Nov. 6, 2014); Norm Thompson Outfitters, Inc.,
2014 WL 5906524 (F.T.C. Nov. 6, 2014).
128 1-Health, Inc., 2014 WL 4252391 (F.T.C. Aug. 21, 2014).
129 See supra Table 4.
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example, consider consumer assessment of the efficacy of a nutritional
supplement. Consumer verification of efficacy proves difficult, especially if
the consumer has made other concurrent dietary or nutritional changes.
Some consumers might test the experience claim of a supplement by looking
for reliable peer reviews or even receiving third-party advice from a medical
professional, but consumers implicitly weigh their personal time and
financial investment against the uncertainty about the utility of any
information they might obtain. Consumers who transact without the
practical ability or intent to evaluate the experience essentially rely on the
credence claim. The costlier the test, the more likely that the claim has the
attribute of credence.
Blended experience-credence claims add another layer of nuance to the
task of sharpening the underlying cost-benefit-driven approach toward
prioritizing enforcement. The critical factor becomes the anticipated level of
the consumer's experience assessment.
D. Credence-Claim Enforcement Examples
Advertisers make credence claims ostensibly because they believe they
will generate sales, but some contention about this conclusion has surfaced.
For example, Lillian BeVier argued that consumers would not trust credence
claims or experience claims because of their non-verifiability.130 Therefore,
BeVier concluded, the "rational advertiser" would avoid "wast[ing]
resources making direct, inherently unbelievable quality claims at all-
either true or false."' 3 ' Roger Schechter responded, however, that if
consumers put any weight behind these credence claims at all, advertisers
would invest behind them and "ultimately . . . exaggerate them."l32 Lee
Goldman concurred with Schechter, observing that
"many advertisements contain credence claims[,] which consumers do not
test." 3 3 Nevertheless, as BeVier (somewhat) acknowledged,1 34 advertisers
do invest in credence claims, and as my content analysis shows next, they
abound in the market.
My sample shows that the FTC actively investigates pure credence
claims, consistent with the FTC's focus on blended claims. "Product-
content" claims present a classic example of a credence claim of concern for
the FTC. In fact, the Commission investigated credence claims about the
130 Lillian R. BeVier, Competitor Suits for False Advertising under Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act: A Puzzle in the Law of Deception, 78 VA. L. REV. 1, 10, 12-13 (1992).
'' Id. at 13.
132 Roger E. Schechter, Additional Pieces of the Deception Puzzle: Some Reactions to Professor
BeVier, 78 VA. L. REV. 57, 76 (1992).
"' Goldman, supra note 22, at 498.
134 BeVier, supra note 130, at 13 n.39.
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amount of recycled content in plastic products.'3 5 Consumers would have
difficulty verifying such claims unless they had a clear view of the sourcing
and manufacturing process. Regulators have more power and resources to
investigate these claims or compel the advertisers to substantiate them.
Deceptive product origin claims fall into this credence category. Not
surprisingly, the FTC promulgated an enforcement policy directed toward
this specific credence-claim problem.1 3 6 Consumers cannot readily verify
where items were sourced or assembled. Private certification of origin also
proves imperfect.' 37 Just as in difficult-to-verify content claims (e.g., the
recycled plastic claims), regulators similarly must intervene to enable
consumers to receive the benefit of the bargain and to protect integrity of
markets.
In another instance, the FTC declined to take action but expressed
concerns about renewable-energy sourcing claims from an electricity
producer.' 38 Such claims prove highly technical and difficult to verify. In
this matter, a citizen petition generated with the guidance of a law-school
clinic brought the problem to the FTC's attention,'" but without the activism
of outside organizers, some claims might not even surface for scrutiny.
Over the past half century, the FTC's approach toward advertising
regulation, first slowly and then suddenly, lurched from one of lethargy and
an absence of discipline to one formally requiring economic analysis.' 4 0 As
consumer markets evolve and regulator resources remain constrained, an
innovative extension of the cost-benefit approach that incorporates the SEC
approach would add rigor to the regulatory prioritization scheme. Credence
claims would likely receive priority.
As I have shown, the basis already exists for using the SEC framework
in a more formal way. If applied with deliberation and rigor, the framework
can enable regulators to sort out which types of claims warrant more
scrutiny. Having established this broader, contextual foundation, in Section
III, I discuss specific areas where the FTC might change enforcement
practices if SEC-driven analysis is deployed.
III. REFINING FTC ADVERTISING ENFORCEMENT
In this Section, I present three problems that the FTC confronts to show
"' Engineered Plastic Sys., LLC, 2014 WL 4651909 (F.T.C. Aug. 20,2014); Am. Plastic Lumber,
Inc., 2014 WL 3752645 (F.T.C. Jul. 24, 2014).
136 See Enforcement Policy Statement on U.S. Origin Claims, 62 Fed. Reg. 63756, 63766-67
(F.T.C. Dec. 2, 1997) (outlining the FTC enforcement policy that a product must be "all or virtually all"
made in the United States to substantiate an unqualified "Made in the USA" claim).
1' See Made in the USA Brand, LLC, 2014 WL 6682518 (F.T.C. Nov. 10, 2014) (taking action
against the use of the "Made in the USA" certification mark in promotion materials for numerous
products that were revealed to contain a significant amount of imported content).
.. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Opinion Letter on Green Mountain Power Corp., 2015 WL 628252, at *1
(F.T.C. Feb. 5, 2015).
39 Id.
40 See infra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
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how the SEC framework may explain current enforcement patterns and
guide future enforcement patterns. In Section IH.A, I show in more detail
that fictitious pricing should be viewed as a credence claim, rather than a
search claim, and elevated to the priority of other credence claims, like
"clean diesel." In Section III.B, I suggest that regulators should scrutinize
peer information brokers (PIBs) like Yelp to preserve the benefits of this
fairly new flood of experience claims while also recognizing the potential
for PIBs to distort the presentation of this information. Although the
proliferation of peer-supplied market information has high social value, any
distortions of experience claims by PIBs prove difficult for consumers to
self-correct. Finally, In Section III.C, I contend that the FTC's recent focus
on native advertising should focus less on curative disclaimers and more on
the actual content within the claims.
A. Addressing Fictitious Pricing
Regulators have historically treated price-advertising claims like search
claims, warranting low regulatory scrutiny.14 ' Regulators should, however,
treat them like credence claims.' 42 The vast bulk of the information-
economics literature warns against interference with price advertising,
particularly restrictions on advertised discounts.'4 3 Restrictions on
advertising tend to impede competition, leading to higher prices." Price
advertising, unimpeded, appears to lead to more transparency and easier
search, resulting in lower prices.
Not all price advertising leads to more transparency and easier search.
Price advertising only constitutes a true search claim if the advertising
"' Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 687-88 (suggesting that regulators' reliance on the notion that
individual consumers or competitors in the industry can seek their own remedy in court is mistaken).
Nearly a generation later, Pitofsky reiterated similar concerns. See Robert Pitofsky et al., Pricing Laws
Are No Bargain for Consumers, 18 ANTITRUST 62, 64 (2004) (stating that the FTC has stopped enforcing
its Pricing Guides and advocating for the FTC to abandon the Guides and for states to repeal their
deceptive-pricing statutes and regulations).
142 See Goldman, supra note 22, at 499 (mentioning the value of price discounting information to
consumers).
' See Friedman, Fictitious Pricing, supra note 3, at 953-56 (discussing former FTC Commissioner
Robert Pitofsky's repeated rationale for deprioritizing fictitious-pricing enforcement).
" For some landmark studies, see, e.g., JOHN F. CADY, RESTRICTED ADVERTISING AND
COMPETITION: THE CASE OF RETAIL DRUGS 20 (1976); ALEX MAURIZI & THOM KELLY, PRICES AND
CONSUMER INFORMATION: THE BENEFITS FROM POSTING RETAIL GASOLINE PRICES 49 (1978); Lee
Benham, The Effect ofAdvertising on the Price ofEyveglasses, 15 J.L & ECON. 337,337 (1972); C. Robert
Clark, Advertising Restrictions and Competition in the Children's Breakfast Cereal Industry, 50 J.L. &
ECON. 757, 759-60 (2007); Jeffrey Milyo & Joel Waldfogel, The Effect of Price Advertising on Prices:
Evidence in the Wake of44 Liquormart, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 1081, 1081 (1999); John R. Schroeter et al.,
Advertising and Competition in Routine Legal Service Markets: An Empirical Investigation, 36 J. INDUS.
ECON. 49, 49 (1987); see also J. Howard Beales et al., In Defense of the Pfizer Factors, in JAMES
CAMPBELL COOPER, THE REGULATORY REVOLUTION AT THE FTC 86-87 (2013) (discussing how
advertising reduces prices).
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plainly presents a price. Price advertising, however, can contain a difficult-
to-verify claim about the price. For example, these claims can warrant that
a price has been discounted from a former price,145 from a competitor
price, 46 or as a "factory" price compared with a full retail price.147 Verifying
claims about the nature and context of an advertised price proves challenging
and costly. Consumers accordingly treat the advertised discount or
comparison as a signal to stop investing time in incremental price
shopping,1 48 which generates the type of price confusion, resource mismatch
and welfare loss that concerned Judge Easterbrook in the credence-focused
QT case.14 9
These pricing claims belong in the credence category, just like clean-
diesel automobile emissions claims or ionized-bracelet claims. In these
cases, consumer claim-verification costs constitute the obstacle to a market
solution. Similarly, regulators should grant these types of pricing claims
high levels of concern. Appropriately categorizing these claims as credence
would lead regulators to scrutinize the claims, ultimately optimizing
regulatory resources.
For decades, the FTC has labeled these price-advertising practices as
deceptive, putting advertisers on notice. For example, the Guides Against
Deceptive Pricing warn that if "an artificial, inflated price was established
for the purpose of enabling the subsequent offer of a large reduction-the
'bargain' being advertised is a false one." 5 o The information economics
scholarship presents a strong consensus that social harm results from
regulatory tolerance of such practices.i' Buyers accept discounting claims
and apparently do not research whether the advertiser made them in good
faith.
The FTC has not enforced this type of claim as a basis for a deceptive-
practices action since the 1960s.15 2 At the state regulatory level,"' and in
14 For FTC guidance about former price comparisons, see 16 C.F.R. § 233.1 (2016).
'" See 16 C.F.R. § 233.2 (2016) (describing a commonly used form of bargain advertising as
offering goods at lower prices than a competitor).
"' The FTC addresses this practice among other similar miscellaneous tactics. See 16 C.F.R. §
233.5 (2016).
4' See Mark Armstrong & Yongmin Chen, Discount Pricing, 605 UNIV. OF OXFORD DEP'T OF
ECON. 1, 25 (Dept. of Econ., Discussion Paper Series No. 1471-0498, 2012),
http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/materials/papers/5819/paper6O5.pdf [https://perma.cc/P4F4-U2L7].
149 FTC v. QT, Inc., 512 F.3d 858, 863 (7th Cir. 2008).
`o 16 C.F.R. § 233.1(a) (2016).
"' See, e.g., Grewal & Compeau, supra note 32, at 56 (analyzing a comprehensive meta-analysis
of welfare losses resulting from discount-price advertising offered in bad faith).
"' The last sighting of the term "fictitious" pricing in an FTC order appeared in 1970, resulting
from a complaint filed the previous year. See Hollywood Credit Clothing Co., 77 F.T.C. 1594, 1604-05
(1970); Friedman, Fictitious Pricing, supra note 3, at 922 n.6.
... See, e.g., People v. Overstock.com, Inc., No. RGl0546833, 2014 WL 657516, at *32, *39 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 2014) (finding Overstock.com in violation of California Fair Advertising Law,
ultimately resulting in a $6.8 million judgment); Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to New York
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private civil actions, deceptive discount-pricing claims have been pursued
recently with mixed results.15 4 Though California law offers consumer
plaintiffs a clear statutory path for pleading harm,' Illinois, for example,
does not.1 5 6 States and private actors cannot address all extant fictitious-
pricing problems. As a result, the expansive national and regional presence
of many retailers may drive the need for federal solutions.
Lawmakers have taken note. In 2014, members of Congress attempted
to draw the FTC's attention to fictitious-pricing practices at so-called
"factory outlets." 5  The FTC's only visible public response to this concern
Executive Law § 63(15) In re Michaels Stores, Inc. (2011) (on file with author) (consent decree between
retailer and New York Attorney General and Michaels Stores concerning misleading sales promotions);
Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to New York Executive Law § 63, Subdivision 15, Op. Att'y Gen.
N.Y. 5 (2004) (consent decree between retailer and the New York Attorney General that includes a
mandate for the retailer to comply with the FTC Guides on Prior-Reference Pricing); Press Release,
Office of the Dist. Attorney, Santa Clara Cty., Overstock Must Pay $6.8 million for Deceptive
Comparison Pricing (Feb. 20, 2014), https://www.sccgov.org/sites/da/newsroom/newsreleases/Pages/N
RA2014/OverstockMustPay 6-8-MillionDollars.aspx [https://perma.cc/3NLV-QXHU].
.' Hinojos v. Kohl's Corp., 718 F.3d 1098, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2013), provides a high-profile
example of plaintiff success in fictitious pricing litigation, driven by unique features in California's
Unfair Competition Law, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2016) and Fair Advertising Law,
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, 17500-09 (West 2015). Ongoing and recent litigation has produced
or pointed toward mixed results. See, e.g., Fourth Amended Complaint, Spann v. JC Penney Corp., No.
12-cv-00215, 2014 WL 10123337 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2014) (settlement terms call for JC Penney to set
aside $50 million for a class); see also Shaulis v. Nordstrom, Inc., No. 15-10326, 2015 WL 4886080 (D.
Mass. Aug. 14, 2015) (notice of appeal filed); Rubenstein v. Neiman Marcus Grp. L.L.C., No. CV 14-
07155, 2015 WL 1841254, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2015); Second Amended Complaint, Branca v.
Nordstrom, Inc., 2015 WL 224229 (S.D. Cal. May 6, 2015) (No. 3:14-cv-2062); First Amended
Complaint, Gattinella v. Michael Kors, Inc., 2014 WL 4419081 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2014) (No. 1:14-cv-
5731) (seeking monetary damages for deceptive and misleading labeling on products sold at Michael
Kors Outlet Stores); Kat Greene, Michael Kors Pays $4.9M to End Outlet Price Class Action, LAw360
(June 12, 2015, 7:33 PM) http://www.law360.com/articles/667560/michael-kors-pays-4-9m-to-end-
outlet-price-class-action [https://perma.cc/Z599-LMAW] (reporting that Michael Kors settled the
Gattinella case for $4.9 million in June 2015); Korri Kezar, JC. Penney Allots $50 million to Settle Class
Action Lawsuit, DALLAS Bus. J. (Nov. 11, 2015, 11:52 AM)
http://www.bizjournals.com/dallas/news/2015/11/ ll/j-c-penney-allots-50-million-to-settle-class.htmi.
' See Kwikset Corp. v. Super. Ct., 246 P.3d 877, 885-86 (Cal. 2011) (noting the "innumerable
ways" consumers could show injury from unfair competition under California's Unfair Competition
Law).
56 The Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (ICFA), 815 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 505 / 1-12 (2015), requires demonstration of a pecuniary harm, which plaintiffs in these cases
have struggled to prove. See, e.g., Kim v. Carter's Inc., 598 F.3d 362, 365 (7th Cir. 2010) ("A private
party ... must show 'actual damage' in order to maintain an action under the ICFA.") (citation omitted);
Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc. No. 12-C-7782, 2013 WL 3866507, at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 25,
2013) (finding no pecuniary injury to satisfy ICFA). In Illinois, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505 / 10(a) refers
to "actual har" in the statute, but Mulligan v. QVC equates actual harm to "pecuniary harm" in its
interpretation. Mulligan v. QVC, Inc., 888 N.E.2d 1190, 1197 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008). The 7"' Circuit cited
that Mulligan opinion and applied that standard in Kim, 598 F.3d at 365-66 ("The actual damage element
of a private ICFA action requires that the plaintiff suffer 'actual pecuniary loss."').
' See Letter from Sheldon Whitehouse, U.S. Senator, to Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Fed. Trade
Comm'n (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/release/sens-and-rep-to-ftc-outlet-
stores-may-be-misleading-consumers [https://perma.cc/Z2TU-G9XB] (asking for a federal investigation
into misleading pricing at outlet stores across the United States).
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was this post by a consumer-education specialist on the FTC consumer
information blog:
Well, even though I write about consumer issues every day, I
have to admit that I was clueless that much of the merchandise
sold at outlet stores is manufactured exclusively for them, and
may be of lesser quality than the merchandise sold at non-
outlet retail locations. The industry says it's responding to
customer demand for merchandise that's similar to what's sold
in the regular retail stores, but at a lower price point. Just as
long as you know that, you can make sure you're satisfied with
the price you're paying for what you're getting.' 8
This official blog post demonstrates that these types of price advertising
claims have credence characteristics. The employee concedes that she, a
consumer information specialist who "writes about consumer issues every
day," did not, until recently, know about the practice, let alone personally
verify claims.
This blog post failed to transmit the fact that these practices had been
deemed and remained unlawful. The Commission counsels retailers not to
advertise sales "at 'factory' prices when they are not selling at the prices
paid by those purchasing directly from the manufacturer . . . [or] offer
seconds or imperfect or irregular merchandise at a reduced price without
disclosing that the higher comparative price refers to the price of the
merchandise if perfect.""'9 Through this blog post, the FTC offered
consumers "caveat emptor" advice, leaving private civil actions, which may
prove daunting in some states,o60 as the sole corrective national enforcement
mechanism for this high-growth zone' 6 ' of fictitious pricing.1 62
In terms of cost-benefit analysis, pursuit of fictitious-pricing actions has
a potential return akin to enforcement of a credence claim, rather than a plain
" Colleen Tressler, Outlet Shopping Getting Your Money's Worth, FED. TRADE. COMM'N
CONSUMER INFORMATION (Mar. 20, 2014), http://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/outlet-shopping-getting-
your-moneys-worth [https://perma.cc/W3D6-Y4UP].
.. Miscellaneous Price Comparisons, 16 C.F.R. § 233.5 (2016).
" ICFA, for example, requires demonstration of a pecuniary harm, which plaintiffs in these cases
have struggled to prove. See, e.g., Kim, 598 F.3d at 365 ("A private party ... must show 'actual damage'
in order to maintain an action under the ICFA."); Camasta v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., No. 12-C-
7782, slip op. at 5 (N.D. 111. July 25, 2013) (finding no pecuniary injury to satisfy ICFA); see also 815
ILL. COMP. STAT. 505 / 10a (2007).
161 See Suzanne Kapner, Retailers' Lines Blur on Outlet Stores, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 12, 2014),
http://online.wsj.com/articles/retailers-lines-blur-on-outet-stores-1413159747 [https://perma.cc/QUC6-
9URR] (describing the rising share of outlets in the retail sales channel).
162 See, e.g., Second Amended Complaint, Malik v. Saks Fifth Ave. LLC, No. 2:14-cv-07600, 2014
WL 7405526, at ¶ 48 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2014) (alleging, in part that advertised outlet prices were not
marked down from prices at the mainline retail store-because outlet products were never sold at the
mainline store); Complaint, Rubenstein v. Gap, Inc., No. BC555010, 2014 WL 4063639, at ¶ 15 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2014) (alleging in part that outlets sell lower quality goods under a regular label).
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search claim. A fictitious-pricing claim obscures pricing, separating the
practice from the kind of basic price advertising that scholars have identified
as lowering prices through competition.
B. Addressing Peer Information Brokers
Consumers have long used third-party-experience claims to support
transaction decisions. As Nelson noted in 1974, "Prior to sampling, a
consumer can obtain information from relatives and friends, consumer
magazines, or even from advertising. The consumer has to decide whether
he will use this prior information as a guide to his sampling . . . .
Technology has enabled consumers to access a flood of peer-based
experience information. Consumers can now incorporate peer reviews
through peer-information-brokerage (PIB) platforms before they transact. In
essence, consumers can borrow the experiences of others and apply them
beforehand, rather than evaluating a transaction afterward, reducing the
likelihood that the first test of a seller experience claim leads to
disappointment.
1. The Power ofPeer Information.
Sellers have long employed the technique of presenting "peer" or
"consumer" endorsements to bolster advertising efficacy, 164 but peer
information amassed and presented through the filter of PIBs raises new and
different concerns.'6 s Peer endorsements are powerful tools.16 6 They
typically reflect "experience" information when presented by the seller, and
the consumer can "borrow" that experience information for making a
transactional decision. "WeightGuard has made a difference. I have lost
163 Nelson, Information, supra note 9, at 312.
6 See, e.g., David Adam Friedman, Debiasing Advertising: Balancing Risk, Hope, and Social
Welfare, 19 J.L. POL'Y 539, 577-79 (2011) (discussing the successful, but now infamous, "Jared"
advertising campaign for Subway).
1' See, e.g., Levitt v. ''clp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1134 (9th Cir. 2014) (assessing the validity of
algorithms that drive presentation of reviews, and concluding that Yelp had the right to withhold positive
consumer reviews and sequence the reviews without facing potential liability for "extortion").
" A decade ago, the FTC commissioned two studies that demonstrated the strong influence peer
endorsements ("testimonials") have on consumers. See MANOJ HASTAK & MICHAEL B. MAZIS, EFFECTS
OF CONSUMER TESTIMONIALS IN WEIGHT Loss, DIETARY SUPPLEMENT AND BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY
ADVERTISEMENTS 12-13 (2004) [hereinafter HASTAK & MAZIS, CONSUMER TESTIMONIALS IN WEIGHT
Loss], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/effects-consumer-testimonials-weight-loss-
dietary-supplement-business-opportunity-advertisements/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/THY3-VDV2]
(summarizing the influential effect testimonials have on consumers); see MANOJ HASTAK & MICHAEL
B. MAZIS, THE EFFECT OF CONSUMER TESTIMONIALS AND DISCLOSURES ON AD COMMUNICATION FOR
A DIETARY SUPPLEMENT 9 (2003) [hereinafter HASTAK & MAZIS, CONSUMER TESTIMONIALS],
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/effect-consumer-testimonials-disclosures-ad-
communication-dietary-supplement-endorsement-booklet/030920consumerreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D5VF-DTYY] (discussing the effects of testimonials to communicate product efficacy
to consumers).
870 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:837
REFINING ADVERTISING REGULATION
weight in the short time since I started," reflects the words of a typical peer
endorsement.' 67
Consumers have difficulty evaluating the truthfulness of the peer- or
celebrity-usage experience and often embrace positive outlier endorsements
as representative, typical outcomes.' 68 If the endorsement contains an
experience claim, the consumer may be more apt to try the offering than
without the endorsement. If an endorsement also contains a credence claim,
the consumer must leap through two high-cost verification hurdles. Consider
a celebrity endorsement. If a company hires Gwyneth Paltrow to report that
using a kale-based soap made her feel more energetic, consumers would
have to verify that (a) Paltrow used the soap and the soap made her feel that
way, and (b) the soap enhanced energy levels. Because of the power of these
endorsements and the difficulty of consumer verification, the FTC cautions
advertisers not to induce unrealistic consumer expectations through the peer
endorsement or "testimonial" technique.1 6 9
However, if a neutral, soap-themed, PIB website presents reviews from
fifty kale-soap users, the aggregate information carries different qualities.
The most informative but inexpensive way to gather information about a
product's quality might be to gather the sum total and range of unbiased
experiences. Nelson suggested that the experience of "relatives and friends"
would have high credibility-in part because the consumer can have
confidence that the product review would be neutral and in part because
consumers know the tastes of their known peers and can adjust a review for
167 HASTAK & MAZIS, CONSUMER TESTIMONIALS IN WEIGHT Loss, supra note 166, at 2.
161 See Ahmed E. Taha, Selling the Outlier, 41 J. CORP. L. 459, 461 (2016) (describing the power
of peer endorsements and the problem with outlier experiences); HASTAK & MAZIS, CONSUMER
TESTIMONIALS IN WEIGHT LOSS, supra note 166; HASTAK & MAZIS, CONSUMER TESTIMONIALS, supra
note 166.
' The FTC Guides warn advertisers that the consumer endorsement should be representative of
"what consumers will generally achieve" through product use. See 16 C.F.R. § 255.2(b).
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those tastes.1 70 PIBs, ranging from Yelpl71  and Angie's Listl 72 to solo
bloggers,1 73 have amplified consumer information sharing well beyond
"relatives and friends." Thus, their role in the dissemination of "experience"
information warrants attention.1 74 Because of the power of experience, any
distortions in the peer-information-brokerage process should confront
regulatory scrutiny, just as they would if made directly through
advertisers.1 75
2. Addressing New Concerns About Presentation of Peer Information
Over the past decade, PIBs have enabled consumers to share an
no Hence the emergence of services like Angie's List and Nextdoor.com. See Shawn Graham, Who
are the People in Your Neighborhood? Nextdoor. com Wants You to Know, FAST CO. (Oct. 26, 2011),
http://www.fastcompany.com/l 790798/who-are-people-your-neighborhood-nextdoorcom-wants-you-
know [https://perma.cc/6URX-6P2C] ("Think of Nextdoor.com as Facebook meets craigslist meets eVite
meets Yelp meets Angie's List.").
". For example, Yelp maintained over seventy-one million reviews and had hosted 135 million
monthly unique visitors by the end of 2014. See YELP INC., Annual Report (Form 10-K), 1, 42 (2015),
http://www.yelp-ir.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=250809&p=irol-sec [https://perma.cc/5MCU-
W5HR] (showing the website received 77,628 desktop unique visitors and 57,770 mobile web unique
visitors in 2014). Additional PIBs include, among others, TripAdvisor, Angie's List, Citysearch,
OpenTable, YP.com, and Zagat, according to a Nielsen study commissioned by Yelp. See Migs Bassig,
Nielsen Study Says Yelp is Most Influential, Most Trustworthy, and Highest-Quality Review Site, REVIEW
TRACKERS (July 12, 2014), http://www.reviewtrackers.com/nielsen-study-yelp-influential-trustworthy-
highest-quality-review-site [https://perma-cc/A6W8-M8XZ] ("Yelp emerges as the most influential,
most trustworthy, and highest-quality review site, ranking above sites like TripAdvisor, Angie's List,
Citysearch, OpenTable, YP.com, and Zagat.").
172 Angie's List, a subscription service for sharing detailed information about service providers, had
over three-million paid subscribers at the end of 2014. See Angie's List Provides Year-end Subscriber
Numbers, SEEKING ALPHA (Jan. 14, 2015), http://seekingalpha.com/article/2818976-update-angies-list-
provides-year-end-subscriber-numbers [https://perma.cc/7HGC-237D] ("Angie's List finishes 2014 with
3,041,651 members.").
" See Pradnya Joshi, Harnessing the Power of the Mom Blogger, N.Y. TIMEs (Mar. 14, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/15/business/media/15adco.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/7N24-6TVF]
(discussing how "marketers have been increasingly harnessing the power of mothers online to reach their
audiences for products.").
174 See Nelson, Advertising, supra note 9, at 747 ("Instead [the consumer] sometimes uses the
guidance of relatives and friends. Hence, that information must sometimes be better information. The
more consumers use relatives and friends, the less they respond to advertising.").
.. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n, Guides Concerning the Use of Endorsements and Testimonials
in Advertising, 16 C.F.R. § 255.0(e) ex. 8 (2009) (discussing "[a] consumer who regularly purchases a
particular brand of dog food [and] decides one day to purchase a new, more expensive brand made by
the same manufacturer"); id. § 255.1 ex. 5 (2009) (describing "[a] skin care products advertiser [who]
participates in a blog advertising service"); id. § 255.2 ex. 7 (2009) (illustrating "[a]n advertisement for
a recently released motion picture [that] shows three individuals coming out of a theater, each of whom
gives a positive statement about the movie"); Rolf Winkler, Yelp Says FTC Won't Act on Complaints
About Its Reviews, WALL. ST. J. (Jan. 6, 2015, 4:27 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/01/06/yelp-
says-ftc-wont-act-on-complaints-about-its-reviews/ [https://perma-cc/7WQV-XVZL] (discussing how
the FTC "examined the software [Yelp] uses to manage consumer reviews on its site and how Yelp
ensures that salespeople can't manipulate reviews.").
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unprecedented amount of experiential information."' In the realm of
experience claims, innovations over the last decade in information sharing
have brought new benefits and concerns. Information brokers like Yelp offer
the opportunity for consumers to freely access or borrow peer experience.177
The FTC guidance on consumer endorsements warns advertisers about
using peer endorsements deceptively, in a manner that might exaggerate the
effect of experience claims. 178 Even in the more recent 2009 review of this
guidance, the FTC did not address endorsements presented through PIBs. 179
The FTC has spoken informally about enforcement and PIBs in the media.180
Mary K. Engle, Associate Director of the Division of Advertising Practices,
recently said,
User ratings [and reviews] would be material to consumers, so
they have to be truthful and non-misleading ... whether it's a
movie, a vacation purchase, electronics, . . . [y]ou go online to
see what other consumers are saying ... . [W]e're looking at
issues where those reviews aren't what they purport to be."s'
PIBs offer an aura of neutrality that enhances the power and credibility
of the information they relay. This power should invite scrutiny of the purity
of the experience information the PIBs relay. When PlBs simultaneously
play the role of seller, questions arise about the integrity of their aggregated
" For usage data on Yelp, in particular, see Annual Report (Form 10-K), supra note 159, at 44-45
(discussing the site's "[tiraffic," "[u]ser [e]ngagement," and "[i]increasing [m]obile [u]sage").
177 I focus more on Yelp because the public company has been a leading niche player in this space.
See id. at 44 (discussing Yelp's revenues and stating that "[e]ach day, millions of consumers use [Yelp's]
platform to find and interact with local businesses").
"' See 16 C.F.R. § 255.2(b) (2009) ("If the advertiser does not have substantiation that the
endorser's experience is representative of what consumers will generally achieve, the advertisement
should clearly and conspicuously disclose the generally expected performance in the depicted
circumstances, and the advertiser must possess and rely on adequate substantiation for that
representation.").
"' See id. § 255.2 (all guidance and examples focused on advertiser). The FTC did address integrity
of stand-alone peer endorsements on blogs, a concern rooted in that then-emergent medium of expression.
See e.g., id § 255.0 ex. 8 (2009) (describing "[a] consumer who regularly purchases a particular brand
of dog food [and] decides one day to purchase a new, more expensive brand made by the same
manufacturer."); id § 255.1 ex. 5 (2009) (depicting "[a] skin care products advertiser [who] participates
in a blog advertising service"); id. at § 255.5 ex. 7 (2009) (illustrating "a college student who has earned
a reputation as a video game expert [and] maintains a personal weblog or 'blog' where he posts entries
about his gaming experiences."); see also FTC Publishes Final Guides Governing Endorsements,
Testimonials, FED. TRADE COMM'N (Oct. 5, 2009), http://www.fic.gov/opa/2009/10/endortest.shtm
[https://perma.cc/DRW8-J9N5] (noting that the notice "address[es] endorsements by consumers, experts,
organizations, and celebrities, as well as the disclosure of important connections between advertisers and
endorsers.").
.so Even without promulgated guidance, the FTC Act permits broad enforcement discretion. See 15
U.S.C. § 45(b)-(c) (2006) (describing the FTC's enforcement authority).
'"' Walt Hickey, Be Suspicious of Online Reviews, Especially Fandango, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Oct.
15, 2015), http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/fandango-movies-ratings/ [https://perma.cc/AE8H-
R7MY1.
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peer experiences.
For example, Fandango, operating in the motion-picture industry,
brokers movie ticket sales while also presenting aggregated movie
reviews.'82 As one analysis demonstrated, until recently, Fandango's
reviews skewed more favorably toward all movies, due in part to their
methodology for rounding ratings.'8 3 Movie ratings aggregated by other
movie PIBs, specifically, the non-ticket-sales-dependent Metacritic, [MDb,
and Rotten Tomatoes, most often ranked movies significantly lower than
Fandango.18 4
The business model behind presentation of review information should
tip off regulators that elevated scrutiny might be in order. Consumers put
experience claims to use, and any deliberate contamination of any seemingly
neutral data should receive scrutiny. A conflict of interest inherent in the
stewardship of such data should raise flags for regulators.
However, regulation may not be as necessary as it might be for credence
claims. Just as with experience claims generally, if a PB13 produces
information that proves inconsistent with subsequent tested experiences, the
PIB should theoretically lose credibility with consumers and the PIB will
either adapt or suffer consequences. Consistent with this need to preserve
credibility, PlBs have developed sophisticated algorithms"' and even "sting
operations"'86 to weed out suspicious reviews.
Complications emerge in this increasingly important space that can
interfere with a natural market solution, however. Advertising-supported
PIBs face the challenge of presenting commercial messages in a way that
does not distort the neutrality offered on the platform. Advertising presented
by a business in conjunction with consumer reviews can potentially distort
the whole of the impression made on consumers.' 87
Regulators should take note that PIBs have the ability to tinker lawfully
" See id ("Fandango has an immediate interest in your desire to see a movie: The company sells
tickets directly to consumers.").
1' See id (noting that "Fandango's star rating was higher than the IMDb rating 79 percent of the
time . . . the Metacritic user score 86 percent of the time . . . and the Rotten Tomatoes user score 74
percent of the time," and reasoning that the discrepancy arose from the fact that "Fandango rounded the
'ratingValue' up ... . [and] . . . doesn't round a rating down when we'd mathematically expect that").
'"See id
8s A civil action where the plaintiff questioned the "accuracy and efficacy" of Yelp's algorithm for
reviews describes Yelp's use ofa review filter. See Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc., 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 131, 134
(Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (holding that "the commercial speech exemption ... applies to Yelp's statements
concerning the accuracy and efficacy of its review filter").
"6 See David Streitfeld, Buy Reviews on Yelp, Get Black Mark, N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 18, 2012),
www.nytimes.com/2012/10/18/technology/yelp-tries-to-halt-deceptive-reviews.html
[https://perma.cc/GL7M-GFRE] (discussing the "sting operation" Yelp set up "to catch" other
"companies trying to manipulate their results").
"8 With consumer endorsements, generally, the FTC has implied that it will consider the whole of
the impression of the advertising to discern deceptiveness. See 16 C.F.R. § 255.2(b) n. 105 (2009)
(warning that disclaimers alone about typicality of results may not change an ad's overall impression).
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with the purity of experience information. A recent Ninth Circuit decision
revealed that Yelp could lawfully present selective experience information,
though the company had not done so.' 8 According to the court, a PifB has
the right to withhold reviews arbitrarily'89 and sell advertising' that could
distort the presentation of supposedly neutral information. However, the fact
that Yelp has chosen a purer path than the one permitted likely reveals that
Yelp recognizes the centrality of neutrality to its business model. Room
exists, however, for other PIBs to take another course-and businesses and
consumers appear to have little direct recourse in that event. Regulators
would have to absorb any slack.
The different business models operating in this sector serve different
purposes and continue to evolve. Angie's List, a P11B focused on localized
household services, derives thirty percent of revenue from consumer
subscriptions.' 9' Expertise-information providers like Consumer Reports, a
nonprofit,' 92 and Edmunds.com 93 (automobiles) help consumers sort
through the comparative process for goods, offering professional assessment
of experience claims. The vibrant competition for information may de-
escalate the need for intervention.
Given the high profile of PIBs, experience information abounds in the
market like never before, in addition to the experience claims made directly
by advertisers. As Nelson observed, the views of "relatives and neighbors"
have credibility-and technology has enabled this collective circle of friends
and neighbors to expand dramatically.' 94 Though the FTC should more
lightly monitor experience claims than credence claims, the integrity of PBs
should receive scrutiny if uncorrected market distortions emerge. Though
'" See Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1133 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding, in part, that Yelp had the
right to withhold positive consumer reviews and sequence the reviews without facing potential liability
for "extortion").
i" 1d. at 1134.
* See Trefis Team, Bull, Bear and Base Case Scenarios for Yelp, FORBES (Dec. 15, 2015, 8:42
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2015/12/15/bull-bear-and-base-case-scenarios-for-
yelp/ [https://perma.cc/ATD4-8QP4] (describing Yelp's advertising business model).
"' Angie's List also sells advertising, but only to businesses above a certain review level. Consumer
Reports raised serious questions about the integrity of Angie's List, raising questions about the impact
of advertising on neutrality. Maggie McGrath, Why Consumer Reports Says You Can't Trust Angie's
List, FORBES (Sept. 18, 2013, 4:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/maggiemcgrath/2013/09/18/why-
consumer-reports-says-you-cant-trust-angies-list/#65632ee5579b.
192 See Jim Guest, From Our President, CONSUMER REPORTS (Jan. 2012),
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/magazine/2012/01/from-our-president/index.htm
[https://perma.cc/6DM9-W7D9] (discussing the company's official name change).
'" See About Us, EDMUNDS, www.edmunds.com/about/ (discussing the company's business
model).
* Nelson, Advertising, supra note 9, at 747; see also Derek Smith, Yelp and the Rise of Consumer
Reviews, Soc. MEDIA TODAY (May 2, 2014), http://www.socialmediatoday.com/content/yelp-and-the-
rise-consumer-reviews [https://perma.cc/6D2H-7E2G] (discussing the drastic increase in P1B sources
over the last decade).
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businesses complain about PIB impurities,s95 consumers may find more
difficulty in discerning and addressing systemic problems.
Regulators should also take care to ensure that any actions taken with
respect to PIBs do not unduly slow the valuable flow of information they
channel into the consumer marketplace. In the end, due to the ultimate
(though limited) ability for consumers to pass judgment on experience
claims and correct course, experience claims should generally draw fewer
resources from regulators than credence claims.
C. Addressing Native Advertising
The SEC framework can also refine enforcement priorities within the
context of addressing other identified problematic market behaviors like
"native advertising." Native advertising describes advertising "content that
bears a similarity to the news, feature articles, product reviews,
entertainment, and other material that surrounds it online."'9 6 The concerns
about native advertising center on consumer confusion about the origin and
credibility of a commercial message. 97
In late 2015, the FTC addressed "native advertising" practices,
promulgating the Enforcement Policy Statement on Deceptively Formatted
Advertisements.'" The FTC guides by stating that "[m]isleading claims
about the nature or source of advertising are likely material ... when an ad
misleads consumers about a material fact."l99 Though native advertising
may contend for the concern of the moment, underlying substantive
advertising claims remain the same. Different types of substantive claims
should generate different levels of concern. The SEC framework can offer
guidance to the FTC for how to prioritize enforcement within this zone. 2 00
' See, e.g., Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., 765 F.3d 1123, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2014) (noting the four plaintiffs
were suing Yelp! Inc. for extortion, claiming Yelp! Inc. manipulated user reviews and penned negative
reviews of their businesses); Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc., 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 131, 135-36 (Cal. Ct. App.
2014) (describing plaintiffs claim that Yelp misled plaintiff to believe user reviews passed a filter that
gave consumer trustworthy reviews).
96 Native Advertising: A Guide for Businesses, FED. TRADE COMM'N [hereinafter FTC NATIVE
ADVERTISING], https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/native-advertising-guide-
businesses [https://perma.cc/6JXK-Z3P5] (last visited Dec. 2015).
'" See id. (explaining that content of "native advertising" is similar to that of many other forms of
marketing).
" FED. TRADE COMM'N, ENFORCEMENT POLICY STATEMENT ON DECEPTIVELY FORMATTED
ADVERTISEMENTS 1 (2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/896923/
151222deceptiveenforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/H78T-FNW4].
.. Id. at 14; see also id. at 14 n.65 ("A claim is considered material if it involves information that
is important to consumers and, hence, likely to affect their choice of, or conduct regarding a product.")
(quoting Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311, 322 (7th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation omitted)).
0 See Sydney Ember, FTC. Guidelines on Native Ads Aim to Prevent Deception, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/23/business/media/fic-issues-guidelines-for-native-
ads.html? r-l [https://perma.cc/G279-GXT8] (advancing the concern that FTC guidelines could be
ineffective due to their unenforceable nature).
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Concerns about native advertising divide into concerns about disruption
of "search" and puffed-up elevation of substance. For example, "search"
disruption in native advertising appears under the guise of "misleading door
openers" when advertisers use a non-commercial pretext to lure the
consumer to view an offering.20 ' The FTC provides the following illustration
of a door opener that would be deceptive without additional disclosure:
On the Newsby [news] site, these [third-party advertiser]
links are formatted to look like news headlines and are
grouped together in a box with headings like "More Content
for You," or "From Around the Web." One of the headlines
appearing in the box is . . . "Running Gear Up: Mistakes to
Avoid." The headline ... appears next to a photo of a runner.
In addition to other training suggestions, the article
recommends Winged Mercury shoes for injury prevention.
The similarity of the Winged Mercury ad's format [and
accompanying heading language] to the type of headlines
Newsby publishes ... is likely to lead consumers to believe it
is an independent news story, and not from the sponsoring
advertiser.202
Modern, digital door openers can slightly disrupt the search process by
steering consumers into corners that they might not otherwise visit. These
digital door openers stand apart from the content of the underlying claim.
Once brought to a digital destination through a tricky "door opener," the
consumer can assess the claim like any other claim, and regulators can assess
the content. Some door openers might lead to a scam, others might lead to a
shoe advertiser's experience-credence claim about injury prevention, as in
the example above. Others might lead to a simple search claim for running
shoes for a set price. The cost-benefit-driven application of the SEC
framework would lead to closer scrutiny of the "Winged Mercury" injury-
prevention claim than the "set price" claim. In other words, the SEC
framework should guide regulators back to examining content.
The FTC indicated that digital news sites, social media, and interactive
gaming provided the primary homes for "misleading door openers." 203 in
this digital world, consumers can close the "open door" more easily (with a
click) than a door in the physical world. The "misleading digital door
opener" inflicts a mild search disruption, easily corrected.
The ease of correction should deprioritize concerns about this aspect of
native advertising. The basis for the portion of the Policy Statement about
misleading door openers references a physical "door opener" case from the
201 FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 198, at 7.
202 FTC NATIVE ADVERTISING, supra note 196.
203 Id
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1970s.20 4  That case involved door-to-door encyclopedia salespeople
misrepresenting themselves as researchers or bearers of prizes in order to
"get in the door." 205 Reversing this type of door opener requires removing a
salesperson from a home, which stands apart from an easily-corrected click.
This encyclopedia case addressed a high-pressure sales practice, not a
substantive problem with a claim.206 The SEC framework enables regulators
to break down which parts of a tactic should be of concern-if this
component of native advertising concerns "search," regulators should direct
resources toward higher-priority concerns.
In contrast, native advertisements that masquerade as straight news
reports 207 and native sponsored endorsements that appear neutral208 should
receive significantly higher scrutiny than "misleading-door-opener tactics."
An advertisement that looks like a news article distorts and exaggerates the
status of both credence and experience claims. By intertwining reporting
with advertising, a news organization can lend strong authority to a claim. 20 9
Though consumers may find it difficult to test a credence claim, if the claim
appears at a glance to come from a respected source, consumers may more
likely view the claim as verified. An experience claim may benefit from
similar illusory support. These tactics serve to bolster unduly the credibility
of the underlying claims, not merely lead the consumer to the claim. 2 10
In sum, native advertising presents a general concern for regulators, but
the SEC framework aids in dissecting which components warrant more
attention. A credence claim made in the context of news reporting should
receive more scrutiny than if made in a neutral context. An experience claim
relayed daily by a radio talk show host might warrant more scrutiny than a
credence claim made in a Superbowl advertisement. 2 1' The misleading door
opener may not present the real problem.
204 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 198, at 7 (citing Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. FTC,
605 F.2d 964, 966-67 (7th Cir. 1979)).
205 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 605 F.2d at 967-69.
06 Id at 967.
207 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 198, at 3 (discussing how ads could be potentially
misleading by posing as news stories).
20' See id. at 9 (describing deceptive endorsements that do not disclose a sponsoring advertiser).
209 See Rebecca Tushnet, Attention Must Be Paid: Commercial Speech, User-Generated Ads, and
the Challenge of Regulation, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 721, 746-47 (2010) ("Consumers trust commercial
messages less than noncommercial ones . . . hidden relationships may give advertisers excessive
credibility by using apparently independent sources to confirm the advertiser's message.").
210 Note that concerns about this practice have also emerged with respect to the integrity of the news
media- See Lili Levi, A "Faustian Pact"? Native Advertising and the Future of the Press, 57 ARIZ. L.
REv. 647, 702-04 (2015) (offering potential solutions to protect the integrity of the press).
211 These tactics often constitute endorsements. An ad copy read aloud by radio hosts or sports
announcers can induce highly effective results because listeners might pay more attention or attach more
credibility to the message. Nitasha Tiku, On-Air Endorsements: The Radio Pitch Makes a Comeback,
INC. (June 1, 2010), http://www.inc.com/magazine/20100601/on-air-endorsements.html
[https://perma-cc/6YXV-PPXD].
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Search, experience, and credence claims can be sorted out and analyzed
in a diverse array of contexts. The three major examples discussed in Section
III-fictitious pricing, peer-information brokerage, and native advertising-
all show how regulators can put the SEC framework to use as an analytical
tool to guide priorities more efficiently. In Section IV, I show how the cost-
benefit approach to advertising regulation has deep roots and that
incorporation of the SEC framework into the formal analytic process may
enable the FTC to generate a higher return from limited Commission
resources.
IV. ADVANCING THE COST-BENEFIT APPROACH TO ADVERTISING
REGULATION
Federal advertising regulation enforcement policy rests with the FTC's
Bureau of Consumer Protection (BCP).212 In 2014, FTC's Office of
Inspector General (OIG) favorably evaluated the BCP's stewardship of
resources. 2 13 The OIG did, however, recommend that the BCP develop more
formal, structured, defined enforcement approaches to further optimize the
general pursuit of consumer protection:
[The BCP should consider] a more structured methodology for
... consumer protection enforcement . . . . A more formal
process to evaluate the universe of consumer complaints using
defined factors, such as estimated consumer harm or economic
impact, with assigned weights for each factor, would provide
a greater assurance that . . . [the BCP] . . . will optimize the
pursuit of its consumer protection mission.2 14
The SEC framework would provide a "structured methodology" to
enable the BCP to optimize further the "pursuit of its consumer protection
mission." 215 With respect to regulatory intervention, the FTC already takes
an "economic" approach toward prioritizing enforcement. 216 As such, the
Commission must deploy limited resources toward the actions that will
maximize welfare. The SEC framework can bring more rigor to that
economic impact calculation, leading to greater social benefit.
In this Section of the Article, I show how a formal incorporation of the
SEC framework would offer a historically consistent advancement toward
improving the rigor of cost-benefit analysis. In Section IV.A, I situate my
212 Division of Advertising Practices, FED. TRADE COMM'N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-
ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection/our-divisions/division-advertising-practices
[https://perma.cc/767J-FHLU].
213 OIG Evaluation Report, supra note 15, at i.
24 Id. at ii.
215
216 See infra Section IV.A-B (discussing the foundation and eventual implementation of the
economic approach).
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proposal within the basic foundational literature about modem advertising
regulation. In Section IV.B, I discuss the historic emergence of the FTC's
cost-benefit approach and the FTC's formalization of this approach in the
1980s. Finally, In Section IV.C, I show that adoption of the SEC framework
would constitute a natural addition to the FTC's approach and would further
the efficacy of advertising regulation.
A. Foundations ofModern Advertising-Regulation Theory
The deceptive-advertising literature suggests an economically driven
enforcement approach, an approach that the SEC framework should further
support. Just as the FTC started to embrace cost-benefit-driven regulation
during the 1980s, Howard Beales, Richard Craswell, Steven Salop, and
others suggested integrating economic analysis into policy making.2 17 These
scholarly contributions offered a foundation to support the FTC's efforts in
that decade to define "deceptive" and "unfair" practices with more precision.
In a landmark 1981 article, written just before the FTC issued key policy
statements on deception and unfairness, Beales, Craswell, and Salop
addressed the regulatory challenge of applying overly broad standards
labeled "reasonable," "deceptive," and "unfair."2 18 The authors conceded
that devising "hard-and-fast rules"2 19 based on these concepts proved
difficult, but they argued convincingly that more rigor and structure could
be brought into standards.220 Beales et al. made several policy
recommendations, among them that completely false claims may be
banned 22' and that "the merits of any action depend crucially on the balance
of costs and benefits of the remedy being considered." 22 2
The authors proposed a number of innovative suggestions for
deployments of cost-benefit analysis. For example, they contended that
217 Though not a complete literature survey, a few pieces (mainly the work of Richard Craswell)
represent the core of the durable scholarship in this area. See, e.g., Howard Beales et al., The Efficient
Regulation of Consumer Information, 24 J.L. ECON. 491, 533-34 (1981) (recommending a cost and
benefit approach to consumer regulation); Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously:
Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565 (2006)
[hereinafter Craswell, Taking Information Seriously] (presenting the costs and benefits of prohibiting
false and misleading statements); Richard Craswell, Regulating Deceptive Advertising: The Role ofCost-
Benefit Analysis, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 549, 551, 562-602 (1991) [hereinafter Craswell, Regulating
Deceptive Advertising] (replying to critiques of the author's economic approach theory); Richard
Craswell, The Identification of Unfair Acts and Practices by the Federal Trade Commission, 1981 WiS.
L. REv. 107, 123-27 (1981) [hereinafter Craswell, Identification] (describing the FTC's approach to
defining "unfairness" with respect to unsubstantiated advertising claims and the question about allocating
risk of harm to consumers).
218 Beales et al., supra note 217, at 531-32.
219 Id at 532.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Id at 533.
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mandating more disclosure to clarify claims would prove more efficient than
outright bans on certain claims. 2 23 Beales et al. also made other efficiency-
related suggestions about who should make disclosures and test claims.2 24
Finally, they concluded that "the most efficient remedies will usually be
those which do no more than necessary to correct the market failure
directly." 225
A few years later, as the FTC advertising regulators took a formal turn
toward economically driven decision making, Craswell reiterated his
"suggest[ion] that the laws against deceptive advertising could best be
understood as applying a form of cost-benefit analysis to the interpretation
of advertisements."2 26 As such, Craswell recommended that regulators look
at each case individually, assess the "total injury"227 that an advertisement
could inflict and whether the advertiser could have affirmatively taken steps
228to prevent consumer injury. Craswell analogized this approach to the
"Learned Hand test." 22 9 This version of the test would offer an economic
standard for deception, factoring in the potential magnitude for consumer
harm and the ease of the ability for advertisers to prevent harm. 2 30
The 1980s literature set the intellectual groundwork for development of
more precise enforcement policies. Next, in Part B, I describe at some length
how the FTC used cost-benefit analysis to develop policy statements on
unfairness, deception, and advertising substantiation. In Part C, I show how
incorporation of the SEC framework would naturally progress from the
patterns of FTC history.
B. Application of Cost-Benefit Analysis
Over the past five decades, the FTC moved from an inept and lethargic
enforcement regime 2 31 toward one that used more rigorous analysis. 232
223 Id at 534-35. The concept of mandatory disclosure has generated recent critiques in some
circles. See, e.g., OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW:
THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014) (suggesting that the benefits of mandated disclosure
are minor and have significant social costs such as undercutting better regulation); Omri Ben-Shahar &
Carl. E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 737-42 (2011)
(documenting several areas in which mandated disclosures are inadequate solutions).
224 Beales et al., supra note 217, at 535-37.
225 Id. at 537.
226 Craswell, Regulating Deceptive Advertising, supra note 217, at 550.
227 Id. at 552.
221 Id. at 552-53.
229 Id at 552.
230 he "Learned Hand test" emerged from Judge Hand's famous use of cost-benefit analysis in
United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
231 An outside assessment in 1969 criticized the agency for "lethargy among the legal staff, political
favoritism, inept management, and a poorly functioning monitoring system." DEE PRIDGEN & RICHARD
ALDERMAN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAW § 8:2 (2015).
232 This transition toward an embrace of applied microeconomics began in the 1970s. See Sidney
M. Milkis, The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer Protection: Regulatory Change and
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Turning away from a focus on the deficient morality of certain advertising
practices, 233 the FTC moved toward an economically driven enforcement
approach, inquiring of the net impact of market conduct 23 4 on consumers and
competition. 2 35
1. Origins of the Economically-Driven Approach
The modern, cost-benefit driven approach to advertising regulation
emerged from a swift and comprehensive institutional reform of the FTC
nearly a half-century ago. First, a "wild and wooly group of students known
as 'Nader's Raiders"' 2 36 launched their own investigation of the FTC and
berated the Commission for focusing on trivial abuses at the expense of more
serious fraud. 237 The Raiders criticized the agency for "lethargy among the
legal staff, political favoritism, inept management, and a poorly functioning
monitoring system." 238
The Raiders' blistering critique of the FTC's overall competence left the
Administrative Pragmatism, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 911, 922-23 (2005) (giving an account of how the FTC
straddled an economic approach and a consumer-movement driven "David and Goliath" approach toward
regulation in that era).
233 The Cigarette Rule embodied the previous FTC approach. See Statement of Basis and Purpose
for Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes, 29 FED. REG. 8324, 8355 (July 2, 1964)
(to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 408) [hereinafter Cigarette Rule]. Of the three prongs to the Cigarette
Rule, which guided the determination of "unfaimess," the second required consideration of "whether [the
practice was] immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous[.]" Id. at 8355. The Supreme Court
referenced this standard. See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 n.5 (1972).
234 See, e.g., Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Acts or Practices" in Section 5 ofthe Federal
Trade Commission Act, 70 GEO. L.J. 225, 247-50 (1981) (discussing the 1980 Unfaimess Statement
"general balancing test" and its limitations).
235 See Letter from the Fed. Trade Comm'n to Hon. Wendell Ford and John Danforth, Comm. on
Com., Sci., and Transp., Commission Statement of Policy on the Scope of the Consumer Unfairness
Jurisdiction (Dec. 17, 1980) [hereinafter 1980 Unfairness Statement], reprinted in Int'l Harvester Co.,
104 F.T.C. 949, 1070-76 (1984). Congress ultimately incorporated the cost-benefit approach into 15
U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012). In 1994, Congress largely codified the former by adding FTC Act Section 5(n):
The Commission shall have no authority. .. to declare unlawful an act or practice on
the grounds that such act or practice is unfair unless the act or practice causes or is
likely to cause (1) substantial injury to consumers which is (2) not reasonably
avoidable by consumers themselves and (3) not outweighed by countervailing benefits
to consumers or to competition. In determining whether an act or practice is unfair,
the Commission may consider established public policies as evidence to be considered
with all other evidence. Such public policy considerations may not serve as a primary
basis for such determination.
Id (emphasis added). For a scathing critique of the implementation of this approach, see
Stephen Calkins, F7C Unfairness: An Essay, 46 WAYNE L. REv. 1935, 1937 (2000) (noting
the "illusion of precision" and lack of utility of the unfaimess standard).
236 PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 221, § 8:2.
237 Id.
23 8 d
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agency "deeply shaken" 23 9 and subject to more formal inspection. 240 After
the Nader Report, President Richard Nixon asked the American Bar
Association (ABA) to "undertake a professional appraisal of the present
efforts of the [FTC] in the field of consumer protection . . . [and] make
recommendations for the future activities ... of the [FTC]."241
The subsequent 1969 ABA Report bluntly attacked the competence of
agency personnel, singling out the problem of resource misallocation for
consumer protection.24 2 This problem reflected concerns about the failure to
use a structured economic approach.2 43 Writing separately in the ABA
Report, Richard Posner, looking at the budget the FTC "expended in the area
of fraudulent and unfair marketing practices, concluded that in "tilting at
windmills," the Commission "bought precious little consumer
protection." 24 5
President Nixon charged his new FTC chairman with reorganizing the
Commission "to initiate a new era of vigorous action" to protect the
consumer."246 "[S]ound economic analysis" would prove central to setting
the priorities of the Bureau of Consumer Protection, a newly established
FTC division. 247 The FTC intended to deploy such analysis in advertising
regulation, but nearly another decade would pass before this analytical ethos
took hold. The concerns of regulators at that formative time still echo in
current policy.
2. Early Implementation ofEconomic Analysis
Before the mid-1970s, the FTC "solicited very little economic advice on
consumer protection policy," and it even took some time after the reforms
for economic analysis to be implemented in the consumer sphere.24 8 Prior to
1974, FTC economists spent virtually all of their time on antitrust and
competition matters and devoted no significant resources to advertising or
consumer-protection issues.249 Some staff economists allocated attention to
239 REPORT OF THE ABA COMMiSSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 93 (1969),
reprinted in I J. REPRINTS FOR ANTITRUST L. & EcoN. 885 (1969).
240 Id. (noting that the FTC faced great scrutiny after the Nader report).
241 Id. at 86.24 2 Id. at 34.
243 Id. at 71-72.
244 In addition to the private sector's compliance and litigation expenditures rising. Id. at 113.
245 Id.
24 Edward F. Cox, Reinvigorating the FTC: The Nader Report and the Rise ofConsumer Advocacy,
72 ANTITRUST L.J. 899, 906 (2005) (internal quotation omitted).
247 Id.
248 See Darlene Brannigan Smith, The Economics of Information: An Empirical Approach to
Nelson's Search-Experience Framework, 9 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 111, 111 (1990) (discussing
the FTC's cautious approach to consumer protection regulation).
249 Pauline M. Ippolito, Consumer Protection Economics: A Selective Survey, in BUREAU OF ECON.,
FED. TRADE COMM'N, EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO CONSUMER PROTECTION ECONOMICS I (Pauline M.
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consumer protection by the mid-1970s, but the FTC assigned no full-time
economist resources to advertising until 1978.250 Prior to this era, consumer
protection and advertising deception "were apparently judged to be issues
that would not benefit from an economic perspective." 25 1
The early transition toward using economic analysis to prioritize
advertising enforcement can be viewed through the account of former FTC
Chairman Robert Pitofsky, regarded by one of his successors as the
"Founding Father" of the "modem Federal Trade Commission." 25 2 In 1977,
Pitofsky provided the deepest, publicly available, nearly contemporaneous
insight into the early implementation of the cost-benefit analysis
approach. 2 53
Pitofsky framed priorities along the lines of addressing market
failures,25 4 an approach that by definition invited economic analysis. With
respect to advertising, he challenged the notion that private actors alone
would solve deceptive advertising problems through market mechanisms,
noting that "in the scores of proceedings in which the FTC successfully
challenged the truth of major advertising themes, there was not a single
instance in which rivals . . . expose[d] deceptions." 255 Pitofsky expressed
certainty that retail markets, if left unfettered, would fail to produce
sufficient and accurate information, yielding market failures.
Pitofsky used the language of economics to summarize his view of the
proper regulatory approach toward protecting consumers from deceptive
advertising:
[Regulation of advertising] should not be a broad, theoretical
effort to achieve Truth, but rather a practical enterprise to
ensure the existence of reliable data which in turn will
facilitate an efficient and reliable competitive market process.
... [W]here consumers are fully capable, through common
sense or simple observation, of protecting their interests
against advertising exaggerations or distortions, there would
Ippolito & David T. Scheffman eds., 1984), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10. 1.1.230.9664&rep=repl&type=pdi#page=7.
250 Id
251 Id
252 See Timothy J. Muris, Robert Pitofsky: Public Servant and Scholar, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
25, 25 (2001) (illustrating Pitofsky's role in shifting the focus of the FTC toward consumer protection).
253 See Pitofksy, supra note 3 (discussing the economic and legal justifications for regulation of
advertising).
254 See id. at 663-67 (exploring the causes of the advertising market failure). Market failure
describes a circumstance where "consumers lack information about the quality or nature of a product,
and therefore cannot make utility-maximizing purchasing decisions . . . . Government intervention ...
may then be desirable." ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBENFELD, MICROEcONoMIcs 290 (2d ed.
1992).
255 Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 667. Rivals seldom challenge each other on fictitious-pricing grounds.
See Friedman, supra note 3, at 944-47 (discussing the difficulties plaintiffs face in such actions).
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be no reason for the law to intervene. 2 56
Pitofsky essentially called for a data-driven, cost-benefit approach toward
prioritizing intervention. His version of that analysis emphasized
intervention when consumers could not "protect[] their interests ... through
common sense or simple observation. "257 This proposal foreshadowed the
approach that would emerge in subsequent years.
Incorporating the SEC framework would mesh with Pitofsky's 1977
assessment. Search claims require less intervention because consumer
"common sense" and "simple observation" corrects most search problems.
As discussed extensively supra, credence claims may not be easily corrected
through such basic methods.
3. Policy Statements and the Formalization ofEconomic Analysis
The current FTC approach to enforcement finds roots in the statutory
mandate to prosecute those engaging unfair and deceptive practices per
Section 5 of the FTC Act. 2 58 The FTC Act declares unlawful, "[u]nfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 2 59 Though advertising practices
can be regulated either through "unfairness" or "deception," the FTC has
prosecuted most advertising cases through the "deception" standard. 260 The
"deception" standard differs from the "unfairness" standard, and both
standards evolved separately.
Though the "unfairness" and "deception" standards are not twins, they
developed with a common purpose. The FTC promulgated what became
known as the Cigarette Rule in 1964, setting the "unfairness" standard for
the next sixteen years.261' This rule framed regulation of trade practices more
in moral terms rather than economic terms,2 62 embodying the approach of
the time. Ultimately, the FTC changed course and replaced the Cigarette
2 Pitofsky, supra note 3, at 671.
257 Id.
258 See JOSHUA D. WRIGHT, COMM'R, FED. TRADE. COMM'N, THE ECONOMICS OF DIGITAL
CONSUMER PROTECTION: ONE COMMISSIONER'S VIEW 3-7 (2014), http://www.fic.gov/
system/files/documents/publicstatements/573061/010731techfreedom.pdf (providing an overview of
the FTC's unfairness standard).
259 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
26 Though the "disjunctive phrase 'unfair or deceptive' clearly suggests" that the FTC can pursue
advertisers on unfairness per se, the FTC has not pursued that path, instead pursuing the deception angle.
JOHN A. SPANOGLE ET AL., CONSUMER LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 67 (2007). The FTC also prosecutes
deceptive pricing under section 12 of the FTC Act, but this section is targeted at advertising of food,
drugs, devices, services, and cosmetics. See 15 U.S.C. § 52 (2012).
261 Cigarette Rule, supra note 223, at 8,325; see also FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S.
233, 244 (1972) (further legitimizing the authority of the FTC to regulate unfair or deceptive acts or
practices).
262 One of the prongs of the test addressed "immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous"
behavior. Cigarette Rule, supra note 223, at 8,355.
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Rule with an economic approach that would prevail for both "unfairness"
and "deception."
a. Addressing "Unfairness" and "Deception"
The FTC replaced the Cigarette Rule,26 3 adopting the Policy Statement
on Unfairness, in 1980.264 Upon adoption, the Commission began to
approach enforcement of "unfair" practices under Section 5 of the FTC Act
using economics-driven, cost-benefit criteria.2 65 In 1994, Congress amended
Section 5 to reflect the 1980 Policy Statement, directing the FTC to pursue
enforcement only where the targeted behavior "causes or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by
consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition."266
The FTC's approach to "deception" proves paramount to understanding
the underlying approach to all federal advertising regulation.2 67 In 1983, a
divided FTC adopted the "Policy Statement on Deception." 268 The 1983
Policy Statement listed three elements that "undergird all deception
cases:"2 69 (1) "[T]here must be a representation, omission or practice that is
likely to mislead the consumer; "270 (2) the practice at issue must be
examined from the standpoint of a "consumer acting reasonably in the
circumstances;" and (3) the "representation, omission, or practice" at issue
in the first prong must be "material."2 7 1
Although these standards do provide some criterion for regulators and
advertisers, they do not provide substantial guidance for prioritization. The
FTC could use these standards as an implicit prioritization filter, but in terms
of assessing the costs and benefits of intervention, the Policy Statement on
Deception offers weaker structuring principles. 2 72
However, the contemporaneously adopted 1984 Policy Statement
Regarding Advertising Substantiation (the 1984 Substantiation Policy
263 Mathew A. Edwards, The FTC and New Paternalism, 60 ADMIN. L. REv. 323,343-44 (2008).
26 1980 Unfairness Statement, supra note 245, at 1070--76 (1984).
265 See id at 1073-74 (explaining the FTC's policy for determining when consumer injury is
"unfair").
26 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (1994) (emphasis added); Wright, supra note 248, at 5-6.
267 See PRIDGEN & ALDERMAN, supra note 236, § 11:1 (illustrating the primacy of deception in
advertising regulation).
268 Letter from the Fed. Trade Comm'n to Hon. John D. Dingell, Chairman, Comm. on Energy and
Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983), reprinted in Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C. I10, 174 (1984).
269 Id. at 175.
270 Id.
271 Id. Materiality and "consumer injury" are likely if the practice leads the consumer to "[choose]
differently but for the deception." Id. at 175-76. In some cases, materiality can be presumed, though
other cases may require presentation of evidence. Id. at 176.
272 See id. at 174.
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Statement)273 provided more directed guidance, reflecting "the direct
influence of the economics of information on advertising regulation." 274 The
cost-benefit spirit of the approach to "unfairness" meshes with the FTC's
specific policy toward advertising substantiation, even though the FTC's
"deception" policy-the foundation for addressing advertising problems-
does not expressly invite a head-on economics approach.
b. Addressing Advertising Substantiation
The 1984 Substantiation Policy Statement reinforced the FTC's
"commitment to the underlying legal requirement of advertising
substantiation-that advertisers ... have a reasonable basis for advertising
claims before they are disseminated."275 Specifically, the FTC emphasized,
"that advertisers [must] substantiate express and implied claims, 2 76 however
conveyed, that make objective assertions" with respect to an offering.277
The FTC warned that objective claims would trigger more scrutiny
about substantiation because such claims "represent explicitly or by
implication that the advertiser has a reasonable basis supporting these
claims." 27 8 Consumers expect advertisers to have such substantiation and
"would be less likely to rely on claims for products and services if they knew
the advertiser did not have a reasonable basis for believing them to be
true." 2 79 If an advertiser does not possess or rely on substantiation that would
support such a "reasonable basis for objective claims," the advertiser's
actions would "constitute[] an unfair and deceptive act or practice in
violation of Section 5 of the [FTC] Act."280
Determining whether substantiation supports a "reasonable basis" for
making a claim requires FTC assessment of "a number of factors relevant to
the benefits and costs of substantiating a particular claim," just as the
Commission would in any "unfairness analysis." 281 The factors considered
include: "[T]he type of claim, the product, the consequences of a false claim,
the benefits of a truthful claim, the cost of developing substantiation for the
claim, and the amount of substantiation experts in the field believe is
273 This Statement was appended to Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 648 (1984), afd, 791 F.2d
189 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
274 Smith, supra note 248, at 111.
275 Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.TC. at 839.
276 The FTC does hold advertisers responsible for implied claims resulting from "reasonable"
interpretations of advertising. "Although firms are unlikely to possess substantiation for implied claims
they do not believe the ad makes, they should generally be aware of reasonable interpretations and will
be expected to have prior substantiation for such claims." Id
277 Id. (describing the FTC's position that advertisers must substantiate all claims and make
objective assertions regarding offers).
278 Id.
279 Id.
281 Id.
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reasonable." 2 82
This policy rests on the well-founded assumption that "consumers
expect less substantiation for easily verifiable claims."2 83 The Policy
Statement on Advertising Substantiation deprioritizes scrutiny of the "easily
verifiable claims" that would likely fall into "search" claims.284 This cost-
benefit approach leads to higher scrutiny of other claims.2 85
The Advertising Substantiation policy implicitly leads to a slightly
higher level of scrutiny for experience claims ("substantiation") than for
search claims. For offerings purchased and experienced repeatedly,
consumers can police experience claims at the mere cost of a failed
sampling,2 86 but for high-ticket offerings like appliances, or the fruits of a
particular college's education, such claims are not as easy to verify.
Credence claims that consumers would find difficult or expensive to
verify need further sorting by risk of generating market failure. This policy
indicates that objective claims require substantiation. Credence advertising
would require less regulatory attention if objective claims are muted.287
Consumers may take expressions of opinion or claims about intangible
attributes lightly because "consumers. . . recognize ... hyperbole" and will
accordingly be skeptical, thus obviating a high-priority need for regulatory
intervention.288
Generally, however, with objective credence claims, the highest level of
scrutiny should be applied, given that they are more likely to mislead than a
search or experience claim. The economics of intervention are favorable. As
noted in the fictitious-pricing discussion, how regulators classify claims
matters. Pricing claims, if unverifiable, should be treated accordingly, and
should require substantiation. Deploying and integrating the SEC
framework in the approach toward advertising advances the economic
approach that the FTC embarked upon in 1969 and accelerated in the 1980s.
C. Incorporating the SEC Framework
Regulators should use the SEC framework to refine further the cost-
benefit approach prescribed by scholars and later adopted by the FTC. The
Commission certainly achieved enormous advances since the early 1980s,
but room for improvement exists. The OIG noted that a more structured
methodology and more formal evaluation process of complaints would
282 id
281 Smith, supra note 248, at 111.
294 Id.
28 Id. at 111-12.
2 See id. at 111 (noting how higher scrutiny of experience claims can result in consumers policing
these claims).
287 Id. at 13 (describing how credence claims would require less attention if the ability to verify
the claims was easier).288 Id at 121.
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optimize resource deployment.2 8 9 Notably, the OIG recommended
establishing a weighted system of factors for measuring consumer harm and
economic impact.290 The OIG offered no public recommendations for
developing such a system, presumably leaving the details to the
Commission.
The SEC framework would provide a robust, accepted starting point for
the FTC to refine and evaluate enforcement priorities. Assessing advertising
claims and market information problems through the lens of search,
experience, and credence would enable more precision in "weighting" the
potential for consumer harm, in particular. In 1991, Richard Craswell further
explained his landmark 1985 endorsement of a cost-benefit approach toward
advertising regulation, 2 9 1 emphasizing the necessity to organize any
economically driven advertisement to focus on the consumer's interests:
"The actual effects of advertising on consumers should be more important
than the match between the advertising and some idealized definition of truth
.... The actual effects of advertising on consumers are just what cost-benefit
analysis seeks to illuminate."292 My proposal aims to incorporate the spirit
of the consumer's experiential perspective-through the lens of how
consumers interact with search, experience, and credence claims-into the
cost-benefit equation. Craswell contended that "[t]he regulation of
deceptive advertising is best viewed as a pragmatic exercise whose purpose
is to make advertising as useful as possible for consumers." 293 Using the
SEC framework furthers that pragmatic exercise by honoring the centrality
of the consumer's engagement with commercial information.
As I have shown through examples, priorities will likely change with
respect to advertising enforcement if viewed through the lens of SEC.
Fictitious pricing could arguably receive credence-claim treatment,
warranting more weight in the "consumer harm" calculation. Peer-
information brokers would face scrutiny as experience-claim "wholesalers."
Regulators would dissect native advertising to separate "misleading-door-
opener" problems from weightier concerns about undue elevation of
substantive claims. Of course, regulators might assess these problems
differently, but adopting the SEC framework will promote a robust
efficiency analysis.
Other considerations should, of course, factor into an analytically
rigorous enforcement-prioritization scheme. Certainly, no panacea exists.
For example, private false-advertising actions brought by competitors under
"' OIG EVALUATION REPORT, supra note 15, at ii.290 id
291 See Craswell, Regulating Deceptive Advertising, supra note 217, at 565-66 (promoting the role
of cost-benefit analysis in advertising regulation).
292 Id. at 551.
293 Id.
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Section 43(A)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act2 94 might reveal a zone where private
actors address informational problems, displacing a need for public
intervention.295 An ongoing assessment of the impact of such activity would
need to mesh with an SEC-driven prioritization scheme. That would be just
one example of many.
In sum, putting the SEC framework in place would provide the FTC with
a structure for a consistent, continuous, inclusive assessment of advertising
regulation priorities.
CONCLUSION
The search-experience-credence framework offers a well-developed
tool for analyzing advertising that regulators can readily deploy to add rigor
and consistency to enforcement priorities. This approach to analyzing
advertising content can help regulators assess newly emerging areas to
determine which types of actions to bring, and it reassess old problems.
Having a rigorous framework in place would help the FTC assess
innovations and the challenges associated with them, as demonstrated in the
peer-information brokerage sector. Even within supposedly novel areas, like
native advertising where the FTC has signaled that higher scrutiny will soon
follow, certain claims might take priority over others when evaluated
through the lens of the SEC framework.
As the FTC takes on rapidly changing delivery of advertising
information, a reliable anchor for systematically assessing new problems,
and reevaluating old ones, would refine and improve the Commission's
efficiency and efficacy. Though dazzling problems like Volkswagen clean-
diesel claims receive extensive media and regulatory attention,2 96 the SEC
framework informs regulators that lower-profile problems like fictitious
pricing, for example, also deserve attention for reducing welfare. A more
rigorous system will remove some of the dazzle from the enforcement-
decision equation and reorganize priorities on a cost-benefit basis, perhaps
satisfying the suggestion from the 01G.
294 15 U.S.C. § 1 125(a)(1)(B) (2012).
295 For a brief overview of the history of the Lanham Act and a discussion of the deficiencies in its
interpretation, see Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A to B: Federal Trademark and False
Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1305, 1309-12, 1384 (2011). In a sharp turn, the Supreme Court
recently expanded standing for false-advertising plaintiffs under the Lanham Act and time will tell how
that impacts advertising and markets. See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 1377, 1387 (2014).
29 Perhaps because Volkswagen recalled eleven-million automobiles worldwide, five-hundred-
thousand in the United States alone. See Jeff S. Bartlett & Michelle Naranjo, Guide to the Volkswagen
Emissions Recall, CONSUMER REP. (July 25, 2016), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/cars/guide-to-
the-volkswagen-dieselgate-emissions-recall- [https://permacc/WPM4-8M7A].
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